Search the Pharmakon Seminars of Bernard Stiegler

Go to: https://pharmakon.epokhe.world/seminaire-hypertexte/

Between 2018 and 2019, Épokhè association member Michel Blanchut has “taken advantage of a period of immobility at home” to transcribe the Pharmakon seminars of Bernard Stiegler, which span from 2012 to 2020 and were recorded between 2014 and 2020. Seeing the efforts by the association in valorizing and preserving the Pharmakon recordings on an academic Peertube instance, Michel proposed in early 2025 to share his transcriptions to the larger community of “amateurs” and “students” of Stiegler’s philosophy, through Épokhè and with my help.

How to make accessible and valorize this huge corpora of hundred of hours of transcriptions online? I wanted to create a “compass” or “hypertextual map” out of them, to help navigate the sprawling philosophy of Stiegler through an appropriate Web edition – rather than simply give access to a drive with separate .docx documents of each seminar session. As part of my PhD activities within the Research Laboratory on Digital Textualities in Montréal with Marcello Vitali-Rosati, we work on the enriched Web book generator “Le Pressoir”, which I saw fit for the mission (despite being made, initially, for more traditional academic books and collections).

With Le Pressoir, we can navigate and articulate these transcriptions using a search bar and annotate them “socially” via Hypothesis (see also this longform I wrote when I was at the INC, concerning this Web annotation tool and our practices). I also automatically indexed, with scripts, the key authors as well as the texts’ titles cited by Stiegler, and embedded within each session page the video recordings on Peertube, that we can listen to while reading and annotating the text, looking at recommended “vocabularies” as to Stiegler’s concepts, …

The aim of it all is to provide to Stiegler’s amateurs and people who study his thought a way to explore and investigate the history of his philosophy in the making, between 2014 and 2020 – his seminars being closely tied to the books he was writing and his different projects. It comes also as a final project of Marcello’s class on Digital Culture, of which the slides were also made with Le Pressoir. What struck me in editing these transcriptions is the extent to which Bernard Stiegler philosophized by re-reading: he articulates and reinterprets different texts he read in the light of current events and the “organological” theory of political economy that he is trying to consolidate through, among other things, his Pharmakon “school”.

I hope that this Web edition will encourage and serve as a support for the listening of the seminars, that is, as a complementary publication to the recordings. The latter keep a “therapeutic” and experiential value, it has been reported by many Épokhè members ; of course, the emotional complexity communicated by the tone, voice, pace of speech, physical gestures of Stiegler are lost in the written words of this Web edition. However, having it as hypertext can allow us to explore them in a more non-linear way, depending on what we search for (the mention of a certain text, author, concept, event, etc.). This makes the Pharmakon school even more a material for research, whether it is undertaken by scholars or by amateurs – if we agree, with Stiegler, that activity of research and even more, of philosophy, is something to be shared much beyond academia and its margins.

We are glad to share this edition with an international community through the INC. In the not-so-far future, we hope that an English version of these transcriptions will be published there as well!

Deathnology: A Furry Practice of Soft Death

Sword Art Online, created by Reki Kawahara, directed by Tomohiko Itō, 2012.

 

I stand still under this newly purchased furied face — a lit-up black mirror stands in front. The body is invited into stillness until numbness takes over. The rate of the heart becomes perceptible, ticking louder while low-pitched. “As if dead” — said the voice that tickles the brain.

I give in a rounded 15 minutes in this position, now seated, that’s the time that I take to convince myself that Taiz— my fursona— can take over. I enjoy inducing these images of a somewhat slow first gen playstation 1 loading bar.
“This game is heavy, therefore takes time.” — at last, Taiz giggles.

 

Login credentials <Enter>

Choose location <Enter>

( a ritual of immersion )

<Enter>.

Video-game platforms and VR chats — for those with more sophisticated gadgets —
prompt the world that Cybernetics once dreamed of, one that Sword Art Online (2012),
like many other future-lead narratives, depicted as a form of LARPing that surpasses
itself: one that transforms role-playing into new logics of affecting what many tend to call
the first, or, the physical body’s emotions and identity-building processes.

Instagram Close Friends story by @carpatosmusic, screenshot by @meii_soh

Video games are often depicted as the main field for those interested in LARPing studies
through their direct association to play. While I believe there to no longer be possible to distinguish the I[1] that is actually at play — online, offline and beyond —, the topics of gamification of life through online capitalistic-driven platforms,[2] or the gamification of gaming itself, like for example Fortnite where players are encouraged to complete daily or seasonal tasks to unlock cosmetic rewards, turn gameplay into productive cycles. It is however in how the play affects, not only the body but identity altogether that I propose us to pause.

For those living in digitised societies, the process of online identity curation—not exclusive to social media— comes to mind, both as a generative form of social engagement and multi-identity split, avatar, etc. In such cases, the act of log-in parallels with the production of new internet-poetics of longing, an intersection that I find curiosity when looking into queer, trans*, or non-normative bodies such as the one of furry identities. Particularly to these bodies, longing is driven by the aftermath of a long session of play, or, in other words, for the search for accessible futures, and safety that anonymity itself provides. In such cases, it seems fair to say that socially driven internet practices might open new conditions for selfhood, recognition, and identity altogether. One where the surveillance of each other— user to user— is purposefully close to impossible.

However, the process of attaining selfhood online is often driven by complex desires to become recognisable — recognition that breeds a need for distinction. In furry, the staging of log-in perpetuates future staging of longing. To long is to log, and vice versa. An emotional experience that exists in both online and offline forms of furry where subjects usually describe logging-off as a cathartic returning to a space that does not serve their actual body’s mental and, or, physical needs.

I- I should say the whole time that the human side of the mind is just sort of off in the background – and then after a few minutes of being out there, human side comes back and is just like: well, I can’t stay out here all night. I have no choice but to go back. Of course[,] that’s depressing, it’s like I can’t stay out in the woods being me, I have to go back and remain in the human world.[3]

In this interplay of wording —log-in / longing —and feelings within digital space, becomes later embodied by offline. An embodiment that I propose as a surpassing of the platform itself, by using what it has taught us — to dissociate and become anew. This is not exclusive to video-games however, as social media platforms do in many ways resemble the rewarding categories of gaming and therefore are games themselves, all users are incentivised to curate, and therefore to dissociate, for the sake of being reward of others’ consumption of a laboured image of self.

The furry suit, in this sense, mirrors the act of entering one’s credentials: both invite play through transformation. Furry and avatars are linked by their capacity for disidentification. This is not to suggest that furries are derived from technology, but rather to acknowledge their shared conditions: interfaces through which the physical body encounters tools of becoming. To log oneself, as a furry, is to stage a soft death — to allow body, language, and at times voice to mutate into another syntax of being. It is a rehearsal of dying as play — a LARPing of death that does not end but multiplies.

This “soft death” exceeds world-building; it becomes ritual. A ritual that allows brain and body to believe that the so-called Beast that shouted in Neon Genesis Evangelion’s episode 26 — that buried multiplicity of self — might awaken. The internet’s induced dissociation becomes the needed password into alternative states of being within oppressive frameworks. Furry practices offer a poignant offline example of digital disidentification, using technology to kill a primary version of the self while forming part of what I call Deathnology: a speculative and embodied methodology of killing the first self as a means of recognition and reprogramming.

Disidentification, as José Esteban Muñoz describes, is a survival strategy — a process of remaking the self from within systems that were never built for one’s full existence. It is neither pure resistance nor assimilation, but a third space that reorients power and recognition.

Across digital mythologies, this is visible not only through gaming or furry practices but also in digital performers such as @pinkydoll, a black woman who, by embodying what many describe as really hot NPC on TikTok, uses gamification, repetition, fantasy, and algorithmic intimacy as tools of visibility and self-making. “Ice cream so good!” she repeats, while receiving pop-up digital gifts that materialise on her screen. Her gestures blur the line between human and avatar, collapsing the distance between body, capital, attention and her own devouring. When, in one of her streams, she briefly interrupts her performance to address her child — “Stop doing that! You are going to kill the dog!” — the illusion shatters. This rupture between fantasy and lived reality exposes how digital selfhood is racialised, gendered, and commodified “She’s not a good mother”, @kaysarahkay (reddit 2023), “At least she’s not using the kid for views 🤷‍♀️”.

Pinkydoll’s embodiment of the NPC becomes a form of digital disidentification — using the machinery of the algorithm to exceed it, and in doing so, re-scripting the ways recognition circulates around the racialised female body. For racialised and gendered bodies, recognition becomes both a site of survival and exhaustion — a double bind that Deathnology seeks to reprogram. Through her, intimacy detaches from the physical body and reconfigures as a tactic of endurance and authorship.

Shall we call it digital curation, identity planning, or resume it to dissociation? I cannot quite yet pin it. But I propose that these are modes of destabilising the walking, breathing body and its assigned identity. They amount to an algorithmic killing of a first form of existence, mediated by dissociation, into new modelling forces of recognition.

If avatars rehearse death through play, cinematic and animated mythologies have long prefigured this. The intersections of technology, death, and identity remind me of Revolutionary Girl Utena (1999), where technology operates as both stage and simulacrum. Within this technological world, bodies are made to conform — emotionally, interpersonally, within love. The stage itself is a machine of ideology, and must be unmade to expose the world it sustains. By the narrative’s end, the two main characters unveil the mechanism: the technological world is revealed as the primary one, while the “outside world” — a place where roads do not yet exist but where “you can always build new roads” — emerges as a site of potentiality. It is here that one may return to oneself, inhabiting a second, third, fourth body perhaps (?) that has escaped the facade.

The gesture of killing the first self runs throughout speculative narratives and performance. To dissolve or suspend tactility and tangibility of self — even momentarily — becomes political and affective training in disidentification. It allows the performer or subject to glimpse the mechanics of recognition: how identity is granted, maintained, or violently affirmed. The killing of the first self, in this sense, is not annihilation but opening — a passage through which another mode of being flickers.

My on-going research project on Deathnology is one that wishes to consider the furry as a practice of soft death — a temporary unmaking of the first body. To wear a suit, to adopt a persona, to move through another creature’s syntax, is one that pierces through acts of play into trans*alteration. The body becomes a membrane that can be inhabited otherwise. There is something deeply queer in that gesture: to die into another form, to love through disguise. Within this speculative field, furry becomes a practice that momentarily surpasses the internet — not as escape, but as fleeting transcendence, a rehearsal of disappearance that still takes place within it.

When Pinkydoll performs her NPC livestreams, saying “Ice cream so good,” she stages an automated body — a surface looped for consumption. But when interrupted by her child’s voice — “Stop doing that! You are going to kill the dog!” — the automation collapses. The loop stumbles and grounds the LARPing back into her lived body. The automation becomes self-aware, exposing the rupture between performance and life. Even as the physical body remains the site of feeling, the digital becomes a refracted skin — another surface that learns to breathe, to blush, to glitch.

Deathnology begins here: not under the pressure of defining separations between physical or digital, but within the unstable bouncing between embodiment and its refusal. The killing here is not an ending but a passage, a soft death that reveals another kind of living. In identity-dependent platforms where the formation of a personal hero or avatar is required, Death traces as spectral — a becoming-apparent through disappearance, a choreography of recognition reprogrammed. An alternatively lived-in software where something that may look just like a player’s death is in fact something else entirely. A proposal at last, that one might live many times within a single lifetime, and that technology is not merely a tool but a mirror reflecting our endless attempts at transformation.

Revolutionary Girl Utena: The Adolescence of Utena, directed by Kunihiko Ikuhara (Japan: J.C. Staff / Toei Company, 1999), video-still.

[1] Hideaki Anno, dir., “The Beast that Shouted ‘I’ at the Heart of the World,” Neon Genesis Evangelion, episode 26 (TV Tokyo, 1996).

[2] Here, I am reminded of the physical-to-online interdependence between users and digital bodies necessary to live and survive as in FarmVille, where engagement and reward systems are mediated by the capacity of a digital body to produce or grow. This relationship mirrors a form of digital labor, triggering a neurological compulsion for productivity, reward, and recognition. Similar dynamics unfold in competitive and open-world online environments such as League of Legends, Fortnite, Overwatch, Valorant, and GTA Online, where a user’s temporal investment and sense of achievement are tied to the growth, maintenance, and social validation of their virtual existence within networked economies.

[3] Courtney N. Plante, Stephen Reysen, Camielle Adams, Sharon E. Roberts, and Kathleen C. Gerbasi, Furscience: A Decade of Psychological Research on the Furry Fandom (Commerce, TX: International Anthropomorphic Research Project, 2023), 632.

Meii Soh is a performer, writer, and researcher working at the intersection of queer identity, non-human narratives, and speculative storytelling. Their practice explores shapeshifting as a survival strategy, tracing how identity—particularly in its fluid, trans*, and dissociative states—can glitch, dissolve, and reassemble through interspecies entanglements and technological interfaces. Soh holds a Master’s degree from the Dutch Art Institute and has recently presented work at Het Nieuwe Instituut, SEA Foundation, the Gothenburg International Biennial for Contemporary Art, and The Wrong Biennale, among others. Currently, Meii is developing written and material research around their self-developed concept Deathnology and furries as speculative offline identities that reprogram recognition.

Digital Tribulations 6: A Radical Hacker-Fanonian Critique of Digital Colonialism

The introduction to this series of interviews can be read here.

 Interview with Deivison Faustino

At the presentation of the MTST’ book in São Paulo, I met Deivison Faustino, a figure who immediately struck me as both likable and interesting. He has a rapper-like style, with his cap worn backwards, and he is a professor as well as a leading scholar and public intellectual in Brazil on the work of Frantz Fanon, the anticolonial writer of the Algerian resistance. Together with Walter Lippold, he is the author of “Colonialismo digital: por uma crítica hacker-fanoniana”. In light of the deep global penetration of North American digital platforms, digital colonialism—whose genealogy is well reconstructed here—should not be understood as a phenomenon limited to Latin America; it concerns us all. 

He speaks with confidence and engaging rhetoric, and we arranged an interview a few days later, at a discussion organized by Geledés – Instituto da Mulher Negra, a civil society organization that defends the rights of women and Black people against racism and sexism, and that carries out advocacy, education, and research activities. The event was titled “Artificial Intelligence – Cyberactivism and the place of Black women in confronting democratic erosion.” Sitting in the third row, I noticed that I was not only the only foreigner, but also the only white man present at the discussion—something that already says a great deal about Brazil’s internal racial divisions, which, according to my interlocutors, are far deeper and more concealed than they might appear.

The conversation, which also involved two other researchers, revisited several issues that have made headlines in recent years, particularly how artificial intelligence can end up promoting disinformation and hate speech, manipulating perceptions, and creating information bubbles. After an excellent refreshment, around 8 p.m., I cornered the poor Deivison for the interview, pleasantly interrupted by a samba playing in the bar on the floor below, which provided a counterpoint to the content of our discussion.

Indeed, although the discourse on digital sovereignty has gained significant prominence in the Brazilian media, I have rarely encountered truly radical critiques of it. Yet radical critique is a duty of thought: Marx urged us to grasp things at their root, while Cornelius Castoriadis saw in the radical imaginary the capacity to bring forth what does not yet exist. And if, with Bernard Stiegler, the risk of computational capitalism lies in the symbolic misery of a passive imagination whose desires are pre-fabricated by the technological industry, then this kind of contribution seems to me central to the debate.

***

The first question is about your trajectory: how did you become interested in the issue of digital sovereignty?

My intellectual journey begins with social movements, especially hip-hop and the Black movement. For a long time, I worked as a researcher of anti-racist thought, studying various authors, until I reached Frantz Fanon. In a way, I helped popularize his name in Brazil. I began studying him when almost no one spoke of him, and a series of transformations in the country allowed Black authors to gain visibility—and at that moment, I was there, presenting Fanon.

Fanon has a discussion on technology that is central to his work, though it is little studied. However, my entry into technology was not through Fanon. In the early 2000s, the free software movement was very strong in Brazil, and several programmers and intellectuals in that movement were linked to popular, Black, and indigenous movements. I was trained by some of these people, especially by Márcio Banto, known as Ikebanto, who to this day is a free software programmer and refuses to use proprietary software under any circumstances. At that time, I was part of a hip-hop collective and was also organizing the Black movement from a radical left perspective. The idea was to develop secure communication technologies to support MST (Landless Workers’ Movement) and MTST (Homeless Workers’ Movement) occupations, while simultaneously discussing themes of revolution and political organization with young people. The free software movement was very attractive to this group, which was already thinking about technology politically. It was the moment when the internet began to spread more widely in Brazil, and digital inclusion for people in situations of social vulnerability was being discussed.

In 2003, with the election of Lula and the appointment of Gilberto Gil at the Ministry of Culture, free software gained momentum. Gil had a clear policy of strengthening the movement, and the Pontos de Cultura (Culture Points) program was essential in this process. These points distributed resources to grassroots social movements to set up studios—and the studios were all based on free software. Thus, the free software community trained hip-hop youth in recording, editing, and filming programs. With these resources, we managed to set up studios in the favelas during a time of great precariousness. It was a different Brazil. Back then, we had a political organization called Grupo Kilombagem, and Ikebanto—this hacker who joined us—upheld a Simondonian idea: everyone should learn to program. I never quite mastered it, but I became convinced it was important. Later, I entered the university and began to study anti-racist thought academically. I found in Fanon a reflection on capitalism and racism that made sense of my previous experience.

The great turning point came in 2020, shortly before the pandemic, when I reconnected with Walter Lippold. He is a hacker, part of the hacktivist movement—what we used to call the “man of the black screen.” Walter was one of those responsible for disseminating Fanon’s thought, scanning and distributing his books freely when there were still no translations in Brazil, in sync with the movement for free information. When we met, I was already studying technologies in Fanon, and the encounter was explosive: we wrote an article together on algorithmic racism. It became so extensive that it turned into the book Digital Colonialism. That has been my journey so far.

I was surprised by the level of Fanon’s popularity here in Brazil. In Italy, for example, this doesn’t exist in the same way. But who was Fanon? Why is his thought relevant to issues of technology, power, and subjectivity today?

Fanon was a thinker, activist, and militant in the national liberation struggles in Algeria. Born in Martinique, he was educated in France and fought in World War II. A crucial point in his thought is the relationship between the universal, the particular, and the singular. He shows how colonial power relations impose a project of “the human” that takes the white man as the parameter. This critique is fundamental for us to think today about algorithmic reasoning—which takes Europe and the United States as the standard, generating biases of territory, language, race, and gender. Fanon was an organic intellectual of the Algerian National Liberation Front and wrote about the political character of technology: colonialism used technology as an instrument of domination. It is important to remember that Fanon wrote in French, but the first translation of his texts was into Italian. This happened thanks to Giovanni Pirelli, son of the owner of Pirelli. He quit his family, became a communist, and financed resistance movements in Africa. Fanon was a close friend of Pirelli, went to Italy frequently, and almost died there. When Fanon died, Pirelli coordinated the Italian translation of his works. Fanon was widely read in Italy in the 1960s by the anti-fascist movement and later by the psychiatrist Franco Basaglia, but he subsequently fell into oblivion. Something similar occurred in Brazil: Fanon was read by the left in the 1960s and by the Black movement in the 1970s and 80s, but then he disappeared. Only with the affirmative action policies in the 2000s—when the Black population began to enter universities and demand Black authors in academic curricula—did his name and those of other Black thinkers return to the center of the debate.

Fanon uses the radio as an example to think about the relationship between technology, colonialism, and anti-colonial struggles. In the 1950s, radio was the most sophisticated communication technology available, and the French used it to penetrate the subjectivity of Algerians: to disqualify the struggle, calling it barbaric or terrorist. The Algerians, at first, began to demonize the radio, seeing it as a colonial technology. Fanon shows that this path was infertile: every technology opens new possibilities and contradictions. The turn in the revolutionary struggle happened when militants stopped demonizing and began to raid French radio stations, stealing transmitters and creating their own programs, such as “The Voice of Algeria.” This technological appropriation changed the course of the struggle and allowed the revolutionary message to penetrate even deeper into the Algerian people. The French, realizing the power of this communication, banned the sale of batteries to Algerians to prevent their access to the radio. 

Fanon concludes that the revolutionary turn is not to reject technology by treating it as an absolute evil, but to contest its terms, to put it at the service of the struggle for justice. This implies understanding how it works—a hacker gesture, so to speak. Here in Brazil, the free software movement and hacktivism played a similar role when they brought open technologies to favelas, quilombola communities, and indigenous villages. Today, we discuss how to update the idea of free software. It is no longer enough to replace Windows with Linux; it is necessary to think about secure networks and free technologies in the face of the global dominance of Big Tech. For this, focusing on software is not enough; we need to discuss hardware and the entire infrastructural geopolitics of contemporary digital colonialism. OpenAI is anything but open. Hacktivism, which emerged as a political rebellion, ended up being co-opted by the neoliberal market of the Californian Ideology—many hackers became entrepreneurs or far-right influencers. Our effort is to rescue the critical dimension of hacktivism and articulate it with Fanon’s thought, which allows for a combination of technological critique, anti-racism, and anti-capitalism.

In Brazil, in recent years, a very important movement for data protection has been forming. However, how does this movement resolve the issue of protection? Sometimes it tends toward an institutionalist place and limits itself to state regulation—without a critique of the State itself and the logic of power. Other times, it does not incorporate racism, which, in a country like Brazil, is a major limitation. The debate remains dominated by white men from the Southeast, even those on the left, and this carries a lot of weight because issues involving other populations end up not entering the agenda as central. So, we are also interested in contesting this movement to think about the necessity of anti-racism as a component element. Discussing data protection or algorithmic racism without incorporating anti-racism and a critique of capital is to reproduce old schemes of domination.

But we were also interested in critiquing anti-racism itself, because we, as Fanonians, move toward anti-capitalist thought. A good portion of the people discussing algorithmic racism did so with a reformist agenda, in the sense of:  there is bias in the algorithm, so how do we solve it? Wait for Google to hire a Black programmer to audit the bias and revise it. Or you receive money from Microsoft to do a project in a quilombo. For us, this solution ends up bringing some limiting traps. So the idea of the “Fanonian hacker” was also to propose a reversal in the way the debate was being framed at that moment.

I think the perspective of regulating personal data protection should always be combined with industrial policy. When Fanon speaks of the need to build one’s own radios, wouldn’t that be equivalent to this idea of autonomous technological production?

Exactly. It is necessary to discuss regulation, but also to build technical, infrastructural, and political alternatives to Big Tech. We need to update the free software movement, create secure communication networks for social movements, and think about organizational strategies outside the regulatory logic. For example, Walter, my research partner, studies cyberwarfare and new forms of surveillance and control. This worries us greatly, especially when we see how proprietary digital platforms make social movements dependent. The information war and the Palestinian genocide exemplify this: companies like Palantir, Meta, and Google provide tracking and control technology. That is why we insist that movements understand the socio-technical dimension of contemporary “death power.”

Two concepts I like from Fanon are “sociogenesis” and the “zone of non-being.” How do you see these concepts applied to the debate on digital sovereignty in Latin America?

These concepts are very dear and very complex. Fanon places sociogenesis in articulation with ontogenesis and phylogenesis: the first as historical-social mediation, the second as singularity, and the third as universality. It is necessary to think about any problem within this triad. Colonialism prevents the recognition of the colonized as a universal human and a singular subject. All modern technological development stems from a Eurocentric notion of the human that excludes the colonized, taking the white person as the universal.

Fanonian sociogenesis politicizes the perception of universality; it shows that what seems neutral is not. Take the case of facial biometrics: the numerical parameters used to define “the human” reflect a racialized gaze, while racism renders the Black person invisible as part of universal humanity. This has mathematical and technological implications, but it also allows us to think about the particular dimension of technological development itself. Furthermore, it allows us to reflect on the particular: what technologies could the South develop to meet its own needs? Big Tech impoverishes this possibility by concentrating power and buying up startups that could generate local solutions. Thus, specific needs cease to be incorporated into the mathematical models that govern artificial intelligence.

There are clear biases: if we search for “Amazon” on Google, we see only the forest. There is a bias here, which is the gaze of the white person from the North upon the Amazon, because the forest itself is a forest in relation to people; that type of forest is the result of indigenous forest cultivation technologies. So, having only the forest without the people is already a partialized view of the Amazon. The invisibility of local contexts has grave consequences, especially when algorithmic models are used in areas like mental health. An algorithm trained with data from the North may pathologize cultural differences or produce wrong diagnoses in indigenous or Black populations. Sociogenesis helps us understand these asymmetries.

Fanon also reminds us that violence is a product of the colonial structure itself. He does not glorify armed struggle, but he recognizes that when violence is already present, the colonized can choose to die passively or to react. Today, this radicalism can be thought of in other terms: refusing digital sovereignty policies that are merely a facade for the expansion of Big Tech, for example. Digital sovereignty is also about asking whom it serves. I might not sign a digital sovereignty manifesto whose motto is to bring a TikTok data center to dry up the water of a quilombola community, for example.

And how do you see the development of the debate on digital sovereignty in Brazil, especially now, with so much presence of the theme in the media and government policies?

Latin America was built from colonization, and this, from the outset, frames the problem in terms of technological development, because it is inserted into capitalism through colonization. This is different from the United States, which was a settler colony, built to be the home of various European ethnicities—a territory where surplus labor, to use a Marxist term, was used for its own development. It is no coincidence that the various North American states united against England to build a project of autonomy and sovereignty that presupposed independent national development. Latin America was the opposite. Except for the territories liberated by Bolívar, national independences did not presuppose autonomous projects of capitalism and national development, but rather the readjustment of colonial logic in other terms. Florestan Fernandes, an important Latin American thinker, says that Brazilian decolonization was “interrupted from above.”

Brazil was a colony of Portugal. In the 19th century, Dom João fled Portugal for fear of Napoleon and came to Brazil, declaring it the seat of the empire. Our independence, led by the prince regent, was a conciliation from above that did not alter the slave structure or colonial property relations. National production continued to be the violent monoculture of export extractivism—sugar cane and, later, coffee. Fanon also speaks of these national bourgeoisies created by and for colonialism to serve the interests of the metropolises; therefore, they neither adhere to democratic and universalist ideals nor aim for political and economic autonomy. They seek only to be intermediaries for colonialism or neocolonialism. This is a very important point.

This always placed Brazil and Latin America in a subservient position, subordinate to the European and US economies, and sustained elites who were violent toward their own people. But in a country like Brazil, which is large—and Brazil differs from other Latin American countries in this aspect—there is a moment when the Brazilian bourgeoisie attempts a type of technological development. This was the era of Juscelino Kubitschek and the policies called “import substitution,” which sought to attract the export of British, American, European, and German capital to develop the technological park so Brazil could move closer to a more developed status. However, this process was late. Brazil developed an important automotive production park, for example, in the 1960s, but at a time when Europe was already exporting its production outside the continent. So, even though Brazil developed technologically more than some Latin American countries like Bolivia or Venezuela, Brazilian development was always subordinate to international capital. Still, there were important advances: the construction of Petrobras, our state oil industry, which provides a very comfortable position for Brazil in international disputes because it is exploited with national capital, with State money, and the royalties return to the State itself.

But what happens with digital technologies? First, there is a school of thought called “developmentalism” that directs this effort of technological development subordinate to central countries. This effort was destroyed by globalization at the turn of the 20th to the 21st century, and the elites dismantled the national industrial park to allow the entry of foreign capital. What is interesting to consider is that, even in the Lula government, sectors began to bet on what some call “neodevelopmentalism”, an attempt to resume the project of technological development, hydroelectric plants, and various branches, but this effort is limited by the high internationalization and financialization of capital in its current stage of accumulation.

It is within this debate that the discussion on sovereignty appears. When the digital issue comes to the center, some people thought it was enough to translate these neodevelopmentalist initiatives into the digital technological sphere; but they ran into the change in the dynamics of capital itself. For example, the export of capital from Big Tech is not so much about technology, but about services. There is a difference here: Volkswagen or FIAT needed to set up a factory here, but Microsoft doesn’t need to set up a factory here; it can even export a data center and rent space in its cloud without employing people or transferring data processing technologies. It is only at this moment, when the data center proves to be a major environmental problem, that Big Tech considers transferring them to Third World countries to access the water and electricity of those territories. But the technological centers remain in Silicon Valley, Shenzhen, or Wuhan. This places a set of obstacles in the way of this neodevelopmentalist intent because it cannot resolve what we call “value transfer” in Marxism: Brazil exports iron, gold, cobalt, lithium, and data, and you import cell phones. It is an unequal exchange that presupposes the enrichment of the more developed country at the expense of the impoverishment of the supplier of primary goods. A colonial path of capitalist development.

So the neodevelopmentalist intent runs into changes in the dynamics of capital itself. What is our problem? Often the debate is conducted based on indicators of sovereignty, such as the data center. We looked at world maps of data centers and identified a wide concentration in the Global North, partly due to climate issues related to the cold in those regions. But this is only the appearance of the phenomenon. When the Lula government creates tax exemption policies for Northern data centers to install themselves in Brazil, it operates as if this were a project of sovereignty, but it is only the intensification of the country’s subaltern position in the international division of labor. What is sovereignty? Is it having to take care of the environmental waste of central capitalist countries? Is it just GDP development? In Brazil, technological development was often achieved through the destruction of indigenous territories and quilombos, displacing Black populations. A true project of sovereignty would aim for investment in science and technology, in the production of technological responses that meet local needs, which includes the construction of data centers under local government management, obviously, but is not limited to that.

There is currently a dispute over the notions of sovereignty. So much so that the MTST will say: it is no use talking about sovereignty if there is no real popular sovereignty. We know that many social movements are outside this debate. The Lula government was under a lot of pressure and is now going to create a national artificial intelligence plan. But the plan often starts from the premise that we “cannot fall behind.” So, you buy sophisticated computers, you buy services, but there is little discussion about equalizing access to these technologies and, above all, creating the scientific conditions for us to produce our own technologies. According to official CGI (Brazilian Internet Steering Committee) research, there are still many people without internet access in Brazil. It has increased in recent years, but there are still many people who only access the internet via SIM cards. You pay five reais, but you can only access Facebook and WhatsApp. A survey from three years ago showed that among the poorest segments, a large number of people in Brazil think the internet is Facebook or Instagram.

A project of sovereignty would imply thinking about structural social inequalities on one hand, but it would also imply thinking about this inequality in terms of a development project: for example, in the matter of communications, if a company is going to have a concession to install cables, it needs to have a counterpart, which should be ensuring that all schools and hospitals have internet access. This never happens. They put the cable in the Southeast; even here in São Paulo, the richest city in Brazil, if you go to Morumbi, which is the richest neighborhood here, you have a greater number of internet antennas than in Paraisópolis, which is the favela just 100 meters from Morumbi. So capital builds its own logic of distribution without having to pay a “toll” to the State, because no one is saying let’s leave the internet, we don’t have the conditions like China has to create our own system, not today, but the demand is for plans that allow investment in local development and the overcoming of inequalities. In this sense, there is a dispute over which project of sovereignty we want. And the impression of many people, including myself, is that the federal government has been serving Big Tech more than social needs. 

Speaking of dependence, do you think there is also a form of epistemic dependence in the Global South?

Undoubtedly. In the 2000s, computer schools proliferated in Brazil, but they taught “Windows,” not computing. People were digitally alphabetized within Microsoft logic. This persists: today many think digital technology is summarized as Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok. This epistemic colonization impoverishes creativity and political imagination. Alternatives exist—platforms and systems that are not based on data extractivism—but they are rarely considered. Politicians and public managers also reproduce this mentality: when we discuss alternatives to Big Tech, they argue that Amazon is “faster” or “cheaper.”

Sérgio Amadeu usually responds: what if the fastest is not the best? Perhaps the best is the most secure, or the one that responds to local needs. There is also a symbolic colonization: surveillance cameras, for example, are sold as synonymous with security, even when they do not reduce violence. Poor municipalities invest millions in cameras while lacking hospital beds and school supplies. No one knows who supplies this equipment, where the data goes, or what interests move this market.

To conclude: you research the relationship between digital systems and public health. In what way can technologies reproduce institutional and structural racism?

I am currently participating in two projects on algorithmic racism and digital health. We are living through an aggressive transition from conventional health to automated models of diagnosis and care. Apps offer therapeutic guidance, and even the SUS (Unified Health System) hires technologies of this type, justifying the replacement of professionals with automation. The question is: if algorithmic racism implies bias, what happens when we replace human care with automated models? The risk is that these mathematical biases translate into wrong diagnoses—and in health, an error means death.

There are already studies in England and the United States showing that, from a logical-mathematical point of view, if social inequalities are not considered in the adjustment of the models, they reproduce the same inequalities. In Brazil, where the Black population dies earlier, Black women die more in childbirth, and indigenous people have higher rates of tuberculosis, the danger is enormous. Racism is a social determinant of health. Therefore, automated systems need to take this dimension into account, but the problem is that those who define automation are the market—and the market privileges surveillance, profit, and global standardization. The struggle now is to ensure that digital care does not deepen the inequalities that already exist.

Life writing, family stories and ‘history from below’

Life writing, family stories and ‘history from below’

By Alison Twells

A Place of Dreams has been many years in the making, the long gestation quite simply because it took me so long to work out what kind of book it should, or could, be.

The book explores the wartime coming-of-age of Norah Hodgkinson, a working-class schoolgirl from the East Midlands. It is crafted from a ‘suitcase archive’ containing 71 pocket diaries, which Norah began writing in 1938, when she was 12 years old. Alongside the diaries was a collection of letters from a sailor who—it turned out—had received a pair of socks Norah had knitted for the Royal Navy Comforts Fund in 1940, and a stash of photographs of him—I’ve called him Jim—and his brother—Danny—who was in the RAF and with whom Norah fell in love.

Piecing together Jim’s letters and Norah’s diary entries, it soon became clear that these were not the kind of men you’d want writing to your fifteen-year-old daughter. But Norah, coming of age in a period in which finding love and romance was the pinnacle of female achievement, was utterly thrilled by her entry into this new grown-up and very modern world.

Norah’s diaries are unique. Despite over sixty years of ‘history from below’, we still have so few accounts of ordinary peoples’ lives told in their own voices and on their own terms. Evidence written by working-class people is more likely to end up in a house clearance skip than an archive. Working-class girls are surely among the most under-represented in history. We have plenty written about them, material which often represents them as a problem in some way. In Norah’s era, we see newspaper articles shrieking fears about the alleged lax morality of girls and young women during the war, and commentaries of social workers, journalists, reformers, the police, the records of juvenile court proceedings and government departments, the concerns of which are usually very far from the girls’ own. As the daughter of a postman and a former domestic servant, might Norah’s diaries allow a different kind of access to a working-class girl’s interior life?

As well as unravelling Norah’s wartime experience, A Place of Dreams asks: what kind of writing would best allow me to tell Norah’s story?

Norah’s diaries are a challenge to read. It is not simply that much of what she wrote about was very mundane. Her daily concerns—the weather, her routines and household chores, the comings and goings of family and friends, her health, love interests and occasional world events—were all shared with other diarists, like the middle-class women who wrote for Mass Observation during the war. But Norah’s diary entries—written in tiny squares that allow for no more than twenty words a day—are more akin to almanacs and pocketbooks than the discursive, introspective diaries that find their way to publication. Laconic and telegraphic, they have little in the way of plot, dramatic tension, character development or self-reflection. Her use of parataxis, the juxtaposition of unrelated daily events, accord the ordinary and extraordinary equal value within any given daily window. The personal pronoun, the ‘I’, is almost entirely absent. Full sentences too. Norah relies on phrases composed of verb/object pairings (‘wrote to Danny’), with an occasional adjective thrown in (‘beautiful letter from my love’). Her style is so terse as to seem almost coded, her disjointed, staccato sentences hard to decipher without insider knowledge.

Given my training, the obvious way forward would be to write about Norah’s diaries, academic-style. Academic historians have much to commend us. We know our sources: their strengths and shortcomings, how they came into being, what they might mean. We are good at probing beneath the surface, steering clear of simplicity, unsettling false certainties. But putting Norah’s archive through the academic mill, subjecting her daily entries to an outside telling, would not get close to her life as she lived it. It could not bring her diaries to life. Nor would it lead to a story that Norah would recognise as her own, or even want to read.

A Place of Dreams builds on long-standing criticisms of academic writing; criticisms which say that our commitment to detachment and distance, to the solemn, argumentative voice of a purportedly neutral ‘hidden narrator’, doesn’t actually do what we claim it does. I ask if story can carry interpretation, if family stories and methods drawn from life writing might allow the kind of ‘insider’ perspective that Norah’s diaries feel to me to need, and if I can do all of this and still call it history…

‘History from below’, I have come to believe, requires more than a focus on an ordinary life written in an academic voice. It requires attention to both form and voice: an exploration of forms that allow other ways of knowing – through family stories and imagination, perhaps; and a writerly presence that is transparent, honest and warm.

For girls as a problem, see Carol Dyhouse, ‘Was There Ever a Time when Girls Weren't in Trouble?’, Women's History Review, 23:2 (2014), 272-274.

For criticism of academic writing, see: Alison Twells, Will Pooley, Matt Houlbrook and Helen Rogers, ‘Undisciplined History: Creative Methods and Academic Practice’, History Workshop Journal, 96:1 (2023), 153-175, and references therein.

For family stories as ‘inside history’, see Alison Light, Common People: The History of An English Family (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2014).

Read A Place of Dreams: Desire, Deception and a Wartime Coming of Age by Alison Twells freely online or buy a copy on our website.

Pictorial Panopticism: A Post-Visual Tractatus

A Review of Alessandro Sbordoni’s Beyond the Image

There is no gold standard for the image anymore.” Alessandro Sbordoni

There is no temptation whatsoever to read Sbordoni’s Beyond the Image: On Visual Culture in the Twenty-First Century as another lament over the collapse of visual truth in the digital age. Here I encounter none of the popular anxieties about deepfakes, social media, artificial intelligence, and the exhaustion of meaning. Beyond the Image successfully dodges the danger of being another nostalgic defense of representation, referentiality, and “Truth.” There is no conservative plea for the return of visual authenticity. This text is a troublesome and indispensable diagnosis of a historical mutation and a break in the regime of visibilities that condition our perception of things.

From a typical Foucauldian standpoint, I see in Sbordoni’s project an observation that another reorganization has occurred for vision as a field of power. Maybe even a potential for a line of resistance as anti-ocularity, a rejection of the algorithmic gaze in favor of parrhesiastic techniques of seeing and being-seen? What the book ultimately charts is the emergence of a post-visual regime where it is not just the case that seeing no longer guarantees knowledge; the idea that looking at something was ever a proof for something being the case is as old a lie as Platonism. Images never really promised reference, and truth was always emergent; it is always a mere superstructure, a connaissance on top of the governmentality, the savoir of the visible. What the book inaugurates is something more relevant, interesting, advanced – an accurate description of how this particular regime, the twenty-first century, manages, governs and deploys its own optical regimes. We are instructed on how perception is trained, formatted, optimized, and governed through algorithmic systems whose primary allegiance is (clearly) not to meaning but to circulation-for-its-own-sake, profitability, and control. Beyond the Image is, I argue, in its own right a genealogy of Pictorial Panopticism: a regime of images that discipline subjects according to the dictates of Capital.

Pictorial panopticism does not just operate by showing too much, it is an organizational principle of vision, a closed circuit. The image does not need to persuade, convince, or even deceive. There is no depth and everything is on the surface, the image only needs to circulate and create fiat value. Power is not invested in the content of the images, content is just the dynamism, the speed of the image; value is produced through movement alone. The rankings, indexes, repetitions that conjure up an imminence, the feeling of an impending doom that sustains anxious scrolling… The crisis diagnosed in Beyond the Image is epistemological and political.

On the one hand, classical panopticism functioned through asymmetrical visibility; on the other hand, being seen without seeing, pictorial panopticism functions through total participation and horizontal diffusion of visibility. It cuts the head off the watchtower. Everyone looks; everyone produces; everyone is exposed. The subject is no longer disciplined by the gaze of the Other but by the requirement to remain legible within an image-economy whose criteria are opaque and whose evaluative metrics are endlessly shifting. One is not punished for invisibility; one simply disappears inside a hall of infinite refractions.

This mutation also marks a deeper anthropological shift: the passage from the mirror stage to the screen stage, from the gaze to the stare. Where the mirror once structured subjectivity through misrecognition, doubling, and identification, the screen abolishes distance altogether. It absorbs directly without reflecting. The gaze, historically bound to desire, lack, and the possibility of resistance, is replaced by the stare: continuous, frictionless, optimized for meaningless endurance. The consumer becomes the regime’s preferred format of subjectivity: measurable, segmentable, endlessly adjustable. To stare is not to contemplate, but to remain operational, available, and extractable. What appears as participation is, in fact, a mode of capture in which vision is no longer oriented toward the world but synchronized with the imperatives of circulation.

This is the decisive mutation Sbordoni tracks: the passage from representation to operativity. Images no longer even pretend to stand in for reality; they stand in for other images, for data, for probabilities, for SEO optimizations (while SEOs are just words-becoming-images). Vision becomes a relay between interfaces. The image triggers an image. It activates. In this sense, pictorial panopticism is inseparable from algorithmic governance. To see is to process; to be seen is to be processed. What makes Beyond the Image compelling is its refusal to mourn this transformation in moral terms. There is no nostalgia for lost depth, no call to restore authenticity, no fantasy of returning to a pre-digital innocence. Sbordoni does not ask us to believe in images again. He asks us to recognize that belief was never the point. Images have always been technologies of power; what has changed is the speed, scale, and abstraction of their deployment.

Since I have a certain habit of reading theory in a particular way, I have to take the next logical step and search Sbordoni’s work for an opening where I can speculate on possibilities for resistance against the tyranny of the image. Clearly, the post-visual regime has no concern for truth, in fact it tosses truth around like a cheap whore, managing its distribution, deployment, and circulation. We can’t rely on better representations as forms of counter-conduct. It must take the form of interruptions, hesitations, refusals to optimize. What becomes political is not what is shown, but how visibility is inhabited. Slowness, opacity, refusal, misuse; these can be weaponized as both aesthetic and strategic gestures.

What ultimately matters, then, is not the ontology of images but their effects on the subject. Sbordoni’s analysis consistently displaces attention from visual content to the transformations images impose on modes of being, attending, and enduring. Images no longer address a viewing subject; they configure one. They train attention spans, modulate affect, recalibrate thresholds of tolerance and boredom, and normalize a state of permanent availability. The subject that emerges from this regime is not deceived or persuaded, but formatted, i.e. rendered compatible with the rhythms, demands, and extractive logics of the image-economy. In this sense, pictorial panopticism is not a theory of control through sight, but a theory of subjectivation through circulation: what images do is produce a subject for whom visibility is no longer an event but a condition of survival.

In this sense, Sbordoni’s work resonates less with traditional visual theory than with a specific and much more effective genealogy of anti-ocular practices. Beyond the Image is therefore not a theory of images but a theory of the conditions under which images govern. Its critical force lies in showing that the post-visual does not mean the disappearance of images but their total saturation of social life. We do not live after images; we live inside their logistics: it is a becoming-image of the body. The panopticon dissolves into interfaces, feeds, metrics, and predictive models. If there is a pessimism here, it is a lucid one. But it is not paralyzing. By refusing the language of loss, Sbordoni forces us to abandon false hopes and misplaced critiques. There will be no return to truth through images, because truth was never their function. The task, instead, is to learn how power perceives and how Capital trains us to perceive for it.

Digital Tribulations 5: Communication, Labor, and Dependency: A Marxist Critique of Digital Sovereignty in Brazil and Latin America

On a cool, sunny morning I take an Uber to the USP campus to interview Professor Roseli Figaro, from the School of Arts and Communications at the University of São Paulo. Riding through the city, the difference between the more central neighborhoods and the wealthy southern ones is immediately visible: more greenery, bigger houses, less noise, fewer people. The flip side of greater affluence is a corresponding rise in the number of assaltos—robberies—and in the state of alert of those who live there, the Uber driver tells me.

He is incredibly kind. When I realized I had entered the wrong address, he offered to take me, free of charge, to the university. I have no cash, but I insist on paying and ask for his PIX number; later I send him the money through a friend. As we chat, I discover the man is, in fact, precisely the subject of the interview’s case study. After Ford shut down in São Paulo, where he worked for twenty-five years, he has been unemployed and cannot find a job, so he supplements his income as a driver. They pay poorly, he says—still smiling—and there is neither sick leave nor vacation.

I thank him and get out on campus, which is enormous. It is one of the most tree-filled areas of the city, and the various buildings are separated by green spaces where you can see long green corridors of tipuana, large trees with dark, deeply furrowed bark, very common along the city’s streets as well. After flowering they produce winged fruits like tiny propellers. Looking for the right building, I pass the stalls by the School of Psychology and Education, where they sell books by Lacan, Winnicott, and many others.

 

The trees in the USPI campus

The entrance to the School of Communication and Arts

The campus atmosphere is very different from the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV), which I visited the day before: a brand-new downtown building that feels almost militarized, with automated turnstiles, cameras, an excess of guards at the entrance, and elevators so technologically advanced that I had to ask how to call them. FGV’s interiors, inspired by “smartness,” reflect a neoliberal design, anonymous and uncannily similar to IKEA living rooms, which can only halt the development of any form of critical thought.

Roseli’s office is the exact opposite: green, modernist interiors, worn PVC steps, and books used as décor. She is a fascinating, courteous figure: a professor with Neapolitan parents who emigrated to Brazil, and an old-school Marxist. Before the interview she offers to have lunch with me at the university’s self-service cafeteria. During the interview, conducted in Portuguese, I cannot help being struck by how Marxist analyses are always sharper: starting from farther away, yet arriving closer to the mark – as the invasion of Venezuela in these days makes clear.

Roseli Figaro in her office

***

What is your trajectory and why are you interested in digital sovereignty? Was there any moment that changed your perspective?

Talking about trajectory and choices…This topic has never left me, because it is part of my story as a person born to working-class, poor parents. I was the first daughter in the family to go to university, the only university professor. I worked as a journalist in the trade-union press, in militant media, and my focus was always on understanding why workers do not understand their own situation of exploitation. That was the issue that brought me back to the university. I graduated in journalism at 21 and, after 10 years working, I returned to university to study the trade-union press, the discourse of the trade-union press that was being produced in the 1980s in Brazil.

After that research, I did my PhD, going deeper into that topic. I sought to understand how workers carried out their processes of reception and meaning-making based on news coming from different outlets: television news – Jornal Nacional was very important, especially in the 1990s – the trade-union press, the religious press, the grassroots neighborhood press and the corporate press. I went to study shop-floor workers at Mercedes-Benz of Brasil. My PhD involved 600 shop-floor workers. This study brought me to the understanding that it is in the world of work, in social relations, that meanings are produced. These workers, who had access to different media outlets and to their own trajectories and points of view, used the workplace to confront and discuss those ideas with other colleagues, building there their viewpoints and their ideological clashes.

This showed me that the world of work was a central mediation for communication processes. I deepened this study until 2005. I went to deliver my book to Armand Mattelart in Paris, because he was a very important interlocutor for me. Jesús Martín-Barbero was also very present and a crucial interlocutor in this process. Until 2007–2008, I deepened this study, observing that communication was a fundamental mediatior of the world of work, not only to produce communicational meanings and the construction of social interactions, but that work and communication have always gone hand in hand. When I went to study ergonomics and ergology in France, in Aix-en-Provence, I began to analyze concrete work situations as communication processes. I understood that it is not possible to work without communication. This was a quite innovative perspective on work, because in certain strands of Marxism, communication is seen as something alien to work.

Looking at work as a communicational process was very important to me. And when I went back to study Taylorism, Fordism and, later, Toyotism – which I explored more in my thesis – I was able to prove that Toyotism, for example, does not introduce any new equipment or physical technology. The technology is social: reorganization of collectives, of work processes, of inputs and outputs of products.

That is why I formulated what I call the “binomial” of communication and work. In my post-doctoral research, I deepened this issue drawing on ergology, which studies the human being at work as a “body-self” that makes use of itself and “lets itself” be used by the other. It differentiates prescribed work – rules, procedures – and effective, real work, the work that is carried out in the unprecedented moment of action. The novelty of work requires communication, because it is in exchange, in interaction, that we recreate our work actions.

From then on, I focused my projects on the world of work of communicators, especially journalists, but I supervised countless studies on other categories: printing workers, call-center operators, book editors, advertisers, domestic workers and textile workers more recently, load handlers in commerce. I was always observing work as a communicational process. In this way we have followed the transformations in the socio-technical basis of work since the 1990s: electronic lathes, robots in factories, digitalization of processes and, in the case of communicators, the arrival of digital technologies and now artificial intelligence into the production process.

When we talk about digital sovereignty, what exactly are we talking about? How has this debate evolved in recent years in Brazil and in Latin America?

To talk about digital sovereignty, first we need to separate what happens in Brazil and in Latin America from what is determined by the hegemonic discourse. The word “hegemony” may even sound outdated, but it is central here. Sovereignty relates to a State. And for a State to be sovereign, it cannot be dependent. Since the 1960s in Latin America, we have had dependency theory. A critical, Marxist-inspired strand – Ruy Mauro Marini, Celso Furtado and others – addresses dependency as an obstacle to sovereignty and as something that blocks Latin America’s development.

There is also the post-war context, the creation of the UN, multilateralism: the idea of interdependent sovereignty, mutual respect among States, cooperation. That holds until the 1960s, until the Vietnam War, and then comes the wave of military dictatorships in Latin America, a U.S. project to keep these countries within its orbit of dependency. With Brazil’s re-democratization in the 1980s, this discussion about dependency and sovereignty does not re-emerge strongly; it seems “old” because, unconsciously, we have already incorporated dependency as something natural, in a non-critical framework. This framework said: “this is how we are going to develop capitalism here and allow the elite and middle class to access the goods that the North already has”.

With digital technologies and the shift from manufacturing industry to the data industry, the game changes. This new industry needs natural resources (water, energy, lithium, silicon, rare earths) and cheaper but qualified labor, which it seeks in the Global South. And it needs societies that accept that subordinate position. In this context, there is a strong push to redefine sovereignty: not as sovereignty of the State, but as individual autonomy, as “ownership” of personal data. This is profoundly damaging for a democratic society because it reinforces neoliberal individualism. “I am autonomous because I have my data”, “I fulfill myself alone”. But 80% or 90% of our population is poor and will never enjoy that kind of “autonomy” in the same way.

At the same time, a progressive-sounding discourse appears that bets on deepening the consumption of technology as a way out. Added to this is a vocabulary – post-human, post-industrial, actor-network theory – that, in my view, shifts the focus away from critical analysis. The center should be human activity in building the self and society, and these concepts end up obscuring the material means of that construction – in particular, the capitalist system. That is why I bring communication and work as the axis: we analyze working and communication conditions and how that builds society. Instead of this, we have a simulacrum of sovereignty, a simulation of individual autonomy. Sovereignty, in its full sense, is something else: it is the capacity of the modern democratic State, with popular participation, to preserve rights, natural resources, scientific and technological capacity.

And what about the discourse of popular digital sovereignty, such as some movements advocate here in Brazil?

Popular digital sovereignty, as formulated by sectors of the Homeless Workers’ Movement (Movimento Trabalhadores Sem Teto) and others, is close to what I am saying, but it removes the word “State”, because the liberal capitalist State is seen as irredeemably negative. This brings together anarchist, Trotskyist and other strands. I find it very positive to emphasize popular sovereignty. But we cannot mislead people: this sovereignty can only be built through a State. There must be a leading body. If it is a bourgeois State, of course it has limits. But what is the concrete alternative? A popular State. You don’t hold assemblies with 200 million people every day. You need organization, institutionalization of representation, networks, so that popular sovereignty can be exercised. The State, for me, is this form of organization and institutionalization.

I have studied at length the genealogy of platformization. There is a corporate strand – Google, Toyota, etc. – but there is another that arises from attempts to improve State planning: giant computers in the Soviet Union, then Cybersyn in Chile, and today what happens in China. This makes me think that we need public digital infrastructure…

Exactly. That is where the “popular” comes in, in the sense of power. When we talk about popular digital sovereignty, we are talking about another State, about another hegemony. But to get there, we need to defend this current State against its full capture by the most reactionary forces. Today, the State often only interests the elites as a repressive apparatus against progressive populations and ideas. Transforming this State means changing its content: from a basically repressive State to a State capable of bringing together and representing other forces. It is a struggle for hegemony within the State, not its abstract negation.

Do you think platformization in Brazil has specific characteristics?

When we talk about platformization, we can understand it in several ways. In a more general sense, it is an attribute for companies that own digital technologies and present themselves as mere intermediaries: a “meeting place”, a “facilitator” of commercial exchanges through their proprietary technologies. This is the dominant idea here. Big Techs arrive in Brazil with this narrative and dominate the market. How? By platformizing the entire production chain, that is, subjecting other businesses to their logic. Look at the case of the restaurant and food-producer network in Brazil and iFood. What we predicted in 2019–2020 – that shopkeepers would complain about iFood – is happening. The company has appropriated the entire chain: restaurant customers, restaurants’ data, customers’ data, knowledge of the production chain. With that, it can regulate the price that the restaurant can offer and controls that relationship, creating enormous dependency. That is platformization.

This spreads throughout commerce. Any store with an e-commerce website depends on cloud infrastructure to store data, customer records, sales history. It needs to use software – this “toolbox” – to run its system. Who provides this toolbox are Big Techs. It is another production chain, but now subordinated to their logic. It is radically different from what we had until the 1980s–1990s with the metalworking industry, food industry, etc., which operated in parallel chains, connected to transport, but not subordinated to a single digital infrastructure. Today, all chains end up subordinated to the logic of the tools offered by Big Techs. We have become much more dependent.

There is also the platformization of work. These companies operate with a small core of highly qualified workers – algorithm, software and hardware developers – although even this group is now starting to face devaluation. Alongside them, there is an army of workers scattered across the world, service providers with no recognized employment relationship, performing fragmented tasks, paid per piece – a 19th-century logic revisited. Lower wages, intense competition, a huge global reserve army, with specialized niches: Venezuela, Brazil, Kenya, for example, working as data annotators for AI, detectors, moderators, etc.

This platformization brings a new form of precarization: segmentation, individualization, competition among peers, while at the same time hiding the boss. The worker competes with other workers, often on the other side of the world, without seeing who controls the platform. Platformization operates on these two fronts: production chains and work. I also really like the spider-web metaphor: the spider spins its web, captures insects and then consumes them. The platform acts a bit like this: it sets the web, captures data, work and relationships, and begins to continuously extract value from this entanglement.

Can we connect all this to the case of PIX? Why was it built in Brazil? What do you think about what the Brazialin government has been doing? 

Isn’t it great? This is national, popular sovereignty. I have not done a specific study on PIX, but the issue is very interesting. The Brazilian ruling class is truly terrible – that is the word. It knows how to take advantage of every situation. PIX, for me, is proof that there is technology, institutional capacity and qualified labor in Brazil. But it is also proof of how financial capital knows how to realize itself in an accelerated way. Capital is realized in circulation; the faster it circulates, the more it is valorized. For the Brazilian ruling class – bankers, the financial system – it was extremely interesting to accelerate its realization through PIX, without going through certain intermediaries and competitors. So PIX deliverz a public infrastructure, technical qualification, a very important popular demand, making people’s lives easier; but all this within the logic of capital, allowing money to be put into pockets faster. That is my thesis: it is technological sovereignty in a certain sense, but at the service of a financial system that remains hegemonic.

We are living through a moment in which these platforms begin to dictate, even to formally independent countries, what it means to “be sovereign”. They arrive selling digital sovereignty solutions to nation-states. What is happening in Brazil is emblematic: separate packages for Google, Microsoft, etc., handing over to these companies the data operations of 11 important institutions that hold population data – health, services, public policies, banking data. All this is wrapped in the discourse that Microsoft will only operate the infrastructure, will build data centers in Brazil, with our money, and that the cloud would be “sovereign”. Why? Because Serpro would be involved. But instead of strengthening Serpro directly – with investment, technology transfer, building internal capacity – the option is to outsource the core of operations to a Big Tech, calling it a sovereign cloud. It is not sovereign. How could it be, if another company controls the cloud? I like the rented-house metaphor: you bring your furniture, build your life there, but the house belongs to someone else. One day the owner knocks on the door and says, “I want the house back.” That is not sovereignty, it is managed dependency.

I am absolutely critical of the way the Brazilian government has been handling this. I had the opportunity to speak briefly with President Lula. He listened to me for about 11 minutes, at a meeting of the National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation. I basically brought him the message I’m giving you here. He listened, thought it was great, told them to publish the text, but in practice what is done is to sign documents that go in the opposite direction. Politics requires negotiations, compromises; external pressures are enormous. In my view, a large part of policy implementation in the United States today is driven by the interests of Big Techs, and the most radical spokesperson for these policies is the side that supports Trump. When these companies cannot get their deals approved, or when countries start passing laws that regulate their activities, they put on pressure. The reaction comes as threats, trade wars, sanctions. It is a very ill-intentioned policy, to say the least.

And platform regulation? How is that legislative debate going?

Regulation is very stalled. We have Bill 2338, which deals with AI, approved in the Senate with several cuts and now stuck in the Chamber of Deputies. At the same time, there is a flood of other bills, many of them clearly written to order for the platforms, seeking “light”, business-friendly regulation. Bill 2630, which aimed to regulate social networks, was defeated in 2022 after a massive campaign by Meta and Google in the media and on their own channels. We received messages like “Careful, the government wants to censor”, that is, outright disinformation. They were fined, but they pay the fine and that’s it. We do not have a Congress committed to popular sovereignty – not even to minimal sovereignty. The portrait of Congress is, to a great extent, the portrait of the most aggressive Bolsonarism. And this is reflected even in issues such as taxation of betting, financial pyramids, “bets”, predatory fintechs. Regulation gets stuck there as well.

You talk a lot about ideological confusion, especially on the side that calls itself left-wing. What do you mean by that?

I use “left” in heavy quotation marks, because it has become too broad a label. In today’s Brazil, just by saying “human rights” you are classified as left-wing. Saying “racial rights”, same thing. Saying “we need to regulate platforms” already puts you on the “left”. So we have everything from a neoliberal left, which accepts the logic of the market with some social cosmetics, to more critical positions. This arc is too wide to solve our analytical problems, but it does show internal diversity – which is real. Within this arc there are various views on platformization, regulation, sovereignty, national development.

There are positions – which are not mine – that see technological development as always positive: “it is inevitable, we must adapt and make the best of it”. From there comes the idea of inevitability and adaptation, even when there is talk of preserving some rights. This generates what I call ideological confusion. It makes it difficult to build organized forces with more lucid diagnoses about what platforms are, what sovereignty is, what these technologies mean when we accept them in a subordinate position – the impact on natural resources, local populations, labor, science.

Sovereignty involves producing knowledge autonomously, and we are losing that. One of the platforms’ strengths is their monopoly over the production of information and knowledge. How can we do autonomous science oriented toward collective well-being if we are begging Big Techs for data, if we do not have sovereign infrastructure, if we do not have adequate budgets? Even while doing a lot with little – and we do – today we lack infrastructure to develop technology of public interest, via public policy, and to train the next generation of scientists. Brazil’s scientific future is, to a large extent, compromised.

Maybe a more cheerful question: do you see spaces of resistance? Unions, associations, platform cooperatives in Latin America seem to be organizing…

If I am here talking to you, I am not a spirit that descended from heaven, right? If I exist and think this way, it is because there is a social base that makes this possible for me, that sustains me. And just like me, there are other colleagues such as Rafael Grohmann, Leonardo Foletto, Sergio Amadeu and so many researchers and activists you will talk to. We are the fruit of resistance that exists in academia and in Brazilian society. It manifests in trade unions, cooperatives, social movements such as MST and MTST, women’s movements, anti-racist movements. There is a strong cultural movement, artists defending their intellectual production. There is a vibrant, productive, creative force.

Our problem is that, because of all this theoretical and political confusion, we do not have a single channel for that power. In critical moments, we need, even with differences, to build that channel: a national instrument, with a few shared slogans, a minimal line of action. I lived through the struggle for re-democratization. In the 1970s, as a student, I saw the importance of organizing, learning from mistakes, building unity to win the amnesty, to push for direct elections, to win the 1988 Constitution. It was not the Constitution of our dreams, but it was what was possible.

Now it is similar: we need a political platform of unity around sovereignty, national and popular development, defense of natural resources and sustainability. We are going to host COP30, spend fortunes to bring people to Belém, and at the same time we are handing over natural resources to Big Techs so they can build data centers that consume water and energy, connected to the exploitation of rare earths, lithium, silicon, etc. It is time to clearly put that on the agenda and negotiate from there, not hand it over on a plate. If we do not have a government and leaders with clarity, who can explain this to the population, we will remain mere consumers of cell phones, thinking that this is a gift.

Can things be done differently? Yes, they can. We have scientists, resources, a huge country. What we lack is political strength. The Lula government is the product of a great alliance to defeat fascism in 2022. That means a government that is internally contradictory. Unity was built to win the election, but not to formulate a great sovereignty plan in this conjuncture. My hope is that, through international politics, especially in the BRICS, space will open to build sovereignty – not because I idealize China or Russia, but because they are examples of countries that, with all their problems, have managed to build more sovereignty.

And, in a pragmatic way, what steps could Latin America take in the next five years?

First, political action. We must escape the right’s tricks to create conflicts between Latin American countries – Milei is one example, Paraguay, etc. If we can strengthen networks with Mexico, Colombia, Chile – and today we are somewhat distant from these countries, which I do not fully understand –, that will be important. We have similar issues, and they can play a key role in building a more integrated Latin America, even if Mexico is, geopolitically, glued to the United States. It is also essential to deepen articulation with BRICS, seeking technology transfer. The Chinese are not “nice guys”; if you do not stand firm, they do not hand anything over. So we must negotiate hard.

Within Latin America there are big asymmetries. Bolivia is very rich in minerals, but has less scientific infrastructure and qualified labor than Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico. Central America also faces many shortcomings in terms of scientific infrastructure. We, compared with the big powers, are small, but we are something. A policy of mutual assistance, of building things together, is fundamental. The very case of PIX is an example: an infrastructure that can be shared without turning it into an instrument of Brazilian imperial projection. Because, yes, many neighbors see us as a small regional empire. Stronger exchanges in the cultural, scientific and economic fields can reinforce Latin-American ties and increase our capacity to exert pressure vis-à-vis the United States and Big Techs.

One question on gender and race. How does the precarization of work, especially under platformization, relate to this?

My perspective is class-based. I am not identitarian, I am not post-structuralist. I respect those who work that way, but I consider it a serious theoretical mistake in the Brazilian case. We are a structurally racist society in which 60% of the Black and brown population is working class, living from selling their labor power – formally or precariously, informally. Brazil has never had 50% of workers in formal employment with rights; that has never happened. Our legacy of colonialism and slavery is very present. If we do not understand gender and race within the logic of colonialism crossed by class struggle, we will get nowhere. Otherwise, everything becomes a moral problem – “good” or “bad behavior” – and not a civilizational problem, a problem of power structure. Talking about “intersectionality” helps to a certain point, but for me it is the question of class that structures the others. The question of the feminine, for instance, goes beyond that of racism when we think of the Black working woman.

Black women in Brazil are on the last rung of the social hierarchy: below white men, below white women and, often, below Black men. What does this mean in practice? That she can be beaten by her husband, suffer harassment from her employer, be beaten in the street, raise children alone, be treated as marginal. She is the last. How can we treat this woman only from a gender perspective? It is enough to re-read Casa-Grande & Senzala with a critical eye to see how the feminine in the “big house” and in the “slave quarters” was a fundamental dividing line in the exploitation of bodies. Platformization and digital technologies have not changed this structure. That is the tragedy: we have advanced technologically, we demand complex cognitive skills, but we cannot, because of the power structure, change values so deeply rooted in our culture.

Don’t you think capitalism has changed so profoundly that we would already be in a state of techno-feudalism?

No, I do not. We are still in capitalism. Capitalism reinvents itself every day, and now it has reinvented itself in a way that, in my opinion, will still take about two centuries for us to find solutions to the problem we have got ourselves into. And I hope I am wrong.

The Machine that makes and Remakes

Impaulsive: Bro-casting Trump, Part I

But first. . .

An Introduction to Bro-casting Trump: A Year-long SO! Series by Andrew Salvati

“The Manosphere Won.”

That is how Wired succinctly described the results of the 2024 election the day after Americans went to the polls.

Among the several explanations offered for Donald Trump’s stunning victory over Kamala Harris, the magazine’s executive editor Brian Barrett argued, one surely had to acknowledge the crucial role played by that “amorphous assortment of influencers who are mostly young, exclusively male, and increasingly the drivers of the remaining online monoculture.”

Sure, there might be some validity in saying that Trump’s election had to do with inflation, with immigration policy, or with Joe Biden’s “doomed determination to have one last rodeo.” But his appearance on several popular male-centered podcasts in the months and weeks leading up to November 5 likely did much to mobilize support for his candidacy among their millions of viewers and listeners. Talking to Theo Von, the Nelk Boys, Andrew Schulz, and Shawn Ryan “cement[ed Turmp’s] status as one of them, a sigma, a guy with clout, and the apex of a model of masculinity that prioritizes fame as a virtue unto itself,” Barrett wrote.

Indeed, during the president-elect’s victory speech, given in the early morning hours of the 6th, his longtime friend and ally Dana White, president of the UFC, took to the speaker’s lectern to acknowledge the contributions that these podcasters and their audiences had evidently made in elevating Trump to the presidency for the second time. “I want to thank the Nelk Boys, Adin Ross, Theo Von, Bussin’ with the Boys, and last but not least, the mighty and powerful Joe Rogan,” he said.

Spraypainted lips on a brick wall

As a media strategy, this was something of an evolution of Trump’s approach in 2016, in which the former reality TV star had used Twitter to such great effect to bypass legacy media institutions and bring his unfiltered message directly to voters. This time around, and reportedly at the direction of his 18-year-old son Barron, Trump again leveraged the massive reach of new media platforms to speak directly to his target demographic of Gen-Z men.

But the strategy was also of a piece with Trump’s frequent assaults on the press, which he typically characterizes as the “enemy of the people.” Appearing in some of the friendlier precincts of the podosphere allowed Trump to skirt around mainstream journalists with their “nasty” questions and cumbersome norms of neutrality and objectivity, and to bask in the mutual admiration society that some of these interviews became. Indeed, as Maxwell Modell wrote in The Conversation not long after the election, podcasters, in contrast to professional journalists, “tend to opt for more of a friendly chat than aggressive questioning, using what research calls supportive interactional behavior … this ‘softball’ questioning can result in the host becoming an accomplice to the politicians’ positive self-presentation rather than an interrogator.”

Podcasts, in other words, provided Trump with a congenial space to self-mythologize, to ramble, and whitewash some of his more extreme views.

In total, Trump appeared on fourteen podcasts or video streams during his 2024 campaign (Forbes compiled a full list, including viewership numbers, which can be found here), which together earned a combined 90.9 million views on YouTube and on other video streaming platforms (it should be noted, first, that these are not unique views – there is likely an overlap between audiences; second, that these numbers do not include audio podcast listens, which, because of the decentralized nature of RSS, are notoriously difficult to pin down).  

For her part, meanwhile, Kamala Harris also made the rounds on podcasts popular with women and Black listeners – key demographics for her campaign – including Alex Cooper’s Call Her Daddy, former NBA players Matt Barnes and Stephen Jackson’s All the Smoke, and Shannon Sharpe’s Club Shay Shay. It has been suggested, however, that the Harris camp’s failure (or perhaps unwillingness) to secure an appearance on The Joe Rogan Experience was a significant setback, and could have provided an opportunity to reach the young male demographic with whom she was struggling. In any event, while the counterfactual “what-if-she-had-done-the-show” will likely be debated for years to come, Rogan eventually endorsed Trump on November 4, throwing his considerable clout behind the once and future president.

While a comparison between Trump and Harris’s podcast strategy during the 2024 campaign would make for an interesting academic study, in the following series of posts, I will be particularly concerned with Trump’s success with the so-called podcast bros – partially because my own research interests are in the area of mediated masculinities, but also because they may have put him over the edge with a key demographic – with Gen-Z men.

Over the next few posts, I will examine several of Trump’s appearances on largely apolitical “bro” podcasts during the 2024 campaign season, including his interviews with Logan Paul, Theo Von, Shawn Ryan, Andrew Schulz, the Nelk Boys, and Joe Rogan. In the course of this examination, I will pay attention not only to what Trump said on these shows, but also to the way in which they established a sense of intimacy, and how that intimacy worked to underscore Trump’s reputation for authenticity. Along the way, I will also discuss the podcasts and podcasters themselves and attempt to locate them within the broader scope of the manosphere. Finally, given the passage of time since Trump’s appearances, I will consider to what extent, if any, individual hosts have become critical of his administration’s policies and actions – as Joe Rogan famously has.

Before I begin, however, I want to make a quick note about the sources: Following what is quickly becoming standard practice in the field, each of the “podcasts” that I analyze in this series has a video component, and in fact, may very well have been conceived of as a video-first project with audio-only feeds added as a supplement, or afterthought. For this series, though, my interest has centered on podcasting as a listening experience, and so the reader may assume that when I discuss this or that episode of Theo Von’s or Andrew Schulz’s podcast, I am referring specifically to the audio version of their shows. This is also why Trump’s interview with Adin Ross will not appear in this series – it was livestreamed on the video sharing platform Kick, and was subsequently posted to Ross’s YouTube channel (and thus is it technically not a podcast).

With that being said, let’s dig in. I will proceed chronologically, with Trump’s first podcast appearance on the boxer/professional wrestler Logan Paul’s show, Impaulsive, which dropped on June 13, 2024.

****

With about 13 minutes remaining in Logan Paul’s roughly hour-long interview with Donald Trump, the conversation turned to aliens. “UFOs, UAPs, the disclosure we’ve seen in Congress recently,” Paul explained, “it’s confusing and it’s upsetting to a lot of Americans, because something’s going, there’s something happening. There are unidentified aerial phenomena in the sky, we don’t know what they are. Do you?”

For his part, Trump responded gamely, and after respectfully listening to Paul, proceeded to tell a story about how, as president, he had spoken with Air Force pilots, “perfect people,” who weren’t “conspiratorial or crazy,” who claim that “they’ve seen things that you wouldn’t believe.” Still, Trump admitted that he had “never been convinced.”

still of an angry white man with overcombed reddish hair and a superimposed UFO on his right shoulder
SO! Screencap of IMPAULSIVE EP. 418

I start with this turn in the conversation not necessarily to dismiss the 29-year-old Paul as a conspiratorial thinker or an unserious interviewer, but rather to highlight the overall tone of the Trump episode, which was overwhelmingly chummy and fawning. It was clear from their deferential posture that Paul and his co-host Mike Majlak were in awe of the former president, and asking such questions was a way of keeping it light and easy.

Logan Paul, after all, is not known for his incisive political commentary. Indeed, in the 17 episodes of Impaulsive that were released in the six months preceding the Trump interview (all of which I have listened to for this piece), political issues hardly featured at all. One exception came during the December 19, 2023 episode with his brother Jake Paul (also a professional boxer, who was recently knocked out in a fight against Anthony Joshua), in which Logan and Majlak discussed the prevalence of right-wing or MAGA content and signifiers as the inevitable backlash to the excesses of the left and the “woke mind disorder,” as Majlak put it. Another example was the January 31, 2024 episode with former co-hosts Mac Gallagher and Spencer Taylor, in which Majlak went on a self-described “rampage” about the problems at the U.S. southern border (in particular, he referenced the Shelby Park standoff, though without naming it), and in which Paul’s father, Greg Paul, got on the mic to declare his support for “Trump 2024.” But other than these incidental moments and superficial takes, the show is not really the place for nuanced discussions of public policy or electoral politics. (Indeed, in the January 31 episode, Paul even attempted to stop Majlak’s rant by noting that listeners didn’t really tune into the show for political discussion).

Nor does Impaulsive, despite all its testosterone-fueled bro-iness, seem to fit comfortably within the manosphere, as I understand that term and what it signifies. Indeed, though Paul and Majlak seem to have fixed ideas about gender and about the differences between men and women, absent from their discussions (at least during the six month sampling of episodes that I listened to) is the kind of misogynistic and reactionary “Red Pill” rhetoric that characterizes manosphere discourses.

This isn’t Andrew Tate, after all, and it’s important that we keep track of the distinction.

young bearded blonde white man in a black suit and white shirt sitting to the left of a young brown haired bearded white man in a navy suit and white shirt, both talking into microphones
SO! Screencap of Paul and Majlak, IMPAULSIVE EP. 418

Impaulsive, rather, serves as a venue for Paul and Majlak to have informal, free-wheeling conversations with their guests – which have included fellow wrestlers, sports stars, internet personalities, rappers, pastors, and even Chris Hansen – on a range of other topics of interest to the hosts. If there is a throughline in all of this (aside from Paul and Majlak’s interest in how guests navigate their social media presence), it is certainly the relationship between the two co-hosts, their similar immature (we might more charitably say “goofy”) sense of humor, their mutual interest in combat sports, and their past history of online and offline hijinks all providing the basic framework for much of their conversation. It also gives Impaulsive listeners a sense of intimate connection with the pair, a sense that they are in the room as a silent participant in the hang.

And Paul has had a decade’s worth of experience in making comedic content. Having first earned a following by posting short videos on Vine as a college freshman in 2013, he dropped out of school and moved to Los Angeles to pursue a full-time career as a social media content creator. Fortunately for him, the gambit worked, and his content was soon reaching hundreds of thousands of followers across Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook in addition to Vine, and a compilation of his videos posted to YouTube amassed more than 4 million viewers in its first week. A number of TV and movie appearances followed, and in 2018, Paul began what would eventually become a professional boxing career with a white-collar match against the British influencer KSI.

Blonde white male teenager holding a blue and white bullhorn
SO! Screencap of Logan Paul Vine Comp 1

Paul’s rise to notoriety wasn’t unmarked by controversy, however. In late December 2017, at a time when he had something like 15 million YouTube subscribers, Paul earned widespread condemnation for his insensitivity after he posted a video to the site showing the body of an apparent suicide victim in Japan’s infamous Aokigahara Forest, and making light of the situation. As a result of the backlash on social media – which included a Change.org petition urging YouTube to deplatform the creator that garnered over 700,000 signatures – Paul removed the video and issued an apology for his actions (this apology was itself criticized for being disingenuous and self-serving, and Paul was later compelled to issue another). For their part, YouTube took disciplinary measures against Paul, which included removing the creator’s channel from the Google Preferred advertising program, and removing him from the YouTube Red series Foursome, among other things.

But that wasn’t all. About a month later, YouTube announced that it would temporarily suspend advertisements on Paul’s channels (the revenue was estimated to be about a million dollars per month) due to a “recent pattern of behavior,” which, in addition to the Aokigahara Forest controversy, now included a tweet in which he claimed that he would swallow one Tide Pod for every retweet he received, and a video in which he tasered a dead rat. The suspension seemed to be little more than a slap on the wrist, however, and two weeks later, in late February of 2018, ads were restored on Paul’s channels.

The controversies continued after the launch of Impaulsive in November 2018. In an episode released the following January, as Paul and Majlak and their guest, Kelvin Peña (aka “Brother Nature”) were discussing their resolutions to have a “sober, vegan January” followed by a “Fatal February” (vodka and steaks), Paul chimed in and suggested that he and Majlak might do a “male only March.” “We’re going to go gay for just one month,” he announced. “For one month, and then swing … and then go back,” Majlak concurred. The implication that being gay was a choice drew sharp criticism online, including a tweet from the LGBTQ+ organization GLAAD, which pointed out, “That’s not how it works @LoganPaul.”

We could continue. But it’s also worth mentioning that in early 2019, Paul underwent a brain scan administered by Dr. Daniel G. Amen, which revealed that a history of repetitive head trauma from playing football in high school had damaged the part of his brain that is responsible for focus, planning, and empathy. Such a revelation may explain some of Paul’s poor decision-making. But it has also been suggested that this may be an excuse for the creator to not own up to his shortcomings. And the diagnosis hardly stopped him from starting a boxing career, which he freely admitted “is a sport that goes hand-to-hand with brain damage.”

But even while Paul’s head injuries may have, to some extent, affected his ability to form human connections, it hasn’t completely severed the possibility. On Impaulisve, Paul often shows a genuine curiosity about his guests, a desire to understand their perspectives, and displays a sense of esteem for those, like the WWE superstars Randy Orton and John Cena, whom he knows personally and professionally outside of the context of the podcast. Even amid the raucous Morning Zoo atmosphere of the show, Paul’s tone when speaking to his guests is usually deferential and flattering, and creates a space not only for sharing intimate revelations about, say, the challenges creators face while living so much of their lives in public (a common topic), but also allows guests an opportunity to present themselves and their work in the best possible light.

SO! Screencap of IMPAULSIVE EP. 407 with (l-r) John Cena, Logan Paul, and Mike Majlak

This kind of dynamic was at play during the Donald Trump interview, in which Paul and Majlak offered the former president plenty of opportunities to boast about the historic accomplishments of his first term and of his 2024 campaign, and to air his many grievances – against Joe Biden, the media, the Democratic Party, and the lawyers prosecuting the many cases against him. Impaulsive, in other words, became a platform for Trump to remediate his typical campaign rhetoric, a means of delivering familiar content in a way that privileged quiet intimacy rather than grandstanding performances.   

This sense of intimacy derived, in large part, from the setting in which the episode was recorded: Paul and Majlak were sat close to Trump in a wood-paneled room at his Mar-a-Lago estate. But it also stemmed from the kinds of questions that the co-hosts asked Trump. At one point in particular, the conversation turned, as it often does on Impaulsive, to combat sports, and to Trump’s love of the UFC. Opening up on this non-political and heavily masculinized subject – and casually mentioning the cheers he receives when he attends UFC events in person – likely increased the former president’s appeal among Impaulisve listeners, who, according to Paul and Majlak, are mostly wrestling and UFC fans themselves. 

SO! Screen Capture of IMPAULSIVE EP. 418

Other questions about combat sports – like whether Paul’s brother Jake could win an upcoming fight with Mike Tyson – further cemented the sense that Trump was a fan among fans, and thus created conditions for what podcast researcher Alyn Euritt calls “recognition,” moments in which listeners may feel a sense of intimate connection with a speaker/host and with the larger listening audience.

But what stuck out to me when listening to the episode and thinking about intimacy and podcasting, was the way in which the calm and deliberate pacing of the conversation, with help from the co-host’s gentle guidance, largely prevented the former president from straying into the kind of stream-of-consciousness delivery that characterizes much of his public discourse, and which has come to be known as the Trump “weave.” Kept on course by a friendly interlocutor pitching softball questions, Trump can sound lucid, even rational – and one can see how, in listening to this, his supporters, and even those apolitical listeners in the Impaulsive audience, can get swept up and taken along for the ride.

This is perhaps true for those moments, which occur often, where Trump touts his own successes and popularity. At the beginning of the episode, for instance, after Trump gave Paul a shirt emblazoned with his famous mugshot (which Paul called “gangster” and said “it happened, and might as well monetize it”), the former president launched into a string of familiar complaints about how his prosecution in that case had been an “unfair” miscarriage of justice, and how it had nevertheless resulted in a fundraising boon for his campaign. “I don’t think there’s ever been that much money raised that quickly,” he declared. Uncritically accepted by the co-hosts – and even encouraged by their muffled chortling – such defiant but matter-of-fact posturing may have seemed reasonable to Impaulsive listeners, an understandable response to what was presented as a blatant act of political persecution.

But the apparent honesty and reasonableness of Trump’s views even seemed to extend to his inevitable criticisms of Joe Biden and the American news media, criticisms which were likewise encouraged by Paul and Majlak’s laughter. When Majlak, for instance, asked Trump whether he was “starting to come around or soften your views on some of the networks that you may have not gotten along with in the past?” Trump’s blunt response, “no, they’re fake news,” was met with legitimating chuckles, and with Paul’s concurring statement, “yeah, fake news.” It was Trump’s follow-up, however, in which he put special emphasis on his May 2023 town hall with CNN’s Kaitlan Collins, that he elaborated his position, revealing that though he had thought the network had turned a corner in terms of its friendliness, or at least neutrality, toward him, they were instead “playing hardball.” Delivered almost in a tone of resignation, Trump seemed to give the impression that his poor (in his eyes) treatment by the press was a given, that their hostility, though unfair, was something that simply had to be endured. Again, this explanation, communicated in such an intimate conversational setting, seemed to suggest a cool and reasonable assessment of the situation and prepared listeners to later accept his more extreme view, expressed less than a minute later, that CNN was “the enemy.”

Overall, then, the episode, which ended with Paul, Majlak, and Trump filming a TikTok video in which the podcaster and presidential candidate squared off face-to-face as if shooting a fight promo, offered Trump a platform to connect with other combat sports fans, to burnish his reputation for authenticity, and to legitimize his many grievances. And while the number of new MAGA converts his appearance earned is an open question, what is clear is that Impaulsive afforded Trump an opportunity to directly speak to a demographic that was increasingly important to both campaigns.  

Series Icon Image Adapted from Flickr User loSonoUnaFotoCamera CC BY-SA 2.0

Featured Image: Paul making his entrance as the WWE United States Champion at WrestleMania XL, CC BY-SA 2.0

Andrew J. Salvati is an adjunct professor in the Media and Communications program at Drew University, where he teaches courses on podcasting and television studies. His research interests include media and cultural memory, television history, and mediated masculinity. He is the co-founder and occasional co-host of Inside the Box: The TV History Podcast, and Drew Archives in 10.

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DIY Histories: Podcasting the Past: Andrew Salvati

Listening to MAGA Politics within US/Mexico’s Lucha Libre –Esther Díaz Martín and Rebeca Rivas

Gendered Sonic Violence, from the Waiting Room to the Locker Room–Rebecca Lentjes

The Future Is You: Perception of Y2K Nostalgia Through Hypnospace Outlaw

Portals such as GeoCities, Worlds, The Palace, and Habitat allowed their users to participate in an alternative reality in which, whether through supposedly naive websites, chat rooms, or metaverses, the primary goal was always to share interests and connect with people from different territories. Over time, as has happened with our organic habitat, many of these networks underwent a kind of virtual gentrification, the main consequence of which was forced submission to terms and conditions dictated by the most powerful people in the world: the 1% that began to be fought against on Tumblr and 4chan more than ten years ago. Following this, as a result of the twenty-year nostalgia cycle, a large number of users have recently become interested in a period they experienced only peripherally: the turn of the millennium. And although to a large extent it is a mere superficial and aesthetic issue, its premise of a failed bright future or utopia echoes an enthusiasm numbed by the logic of a world that is increasingly less suited to human rhythm.

This is where the video game Hypnospace Outlaw, produced by No More Robots in 2019, comes in. The game circles around contradictory feelings of nostalgia at the dawn of the internet. Beyond being a virtual tour loaded with popular references, Hypnospace Outlaw functions as a truthful and realistic tribute to an often idealized way of being virtual. Therefore, based on its narrative and formal analysis, parallels will be established with which to rethink the fin-de-siècle period of internet history and how it dialogues with a future situated in the present. Through certain commonplaces of nostalgia that beat tacitly in this work, we will reflect on the need to advocate for a renewed spirit with which to face a virtual everyday life that, despite being beneficial, consumes us as a community into a distracted and gray mass. Therefore, an approach to creations such as Hypnospace Outlaw will allow us to take a step back and rescue a transformative potential from a privileged position, that of the present, which is already filtered by the true lived experience.

You may ask Yourself, ‘Where does that Highway go to?’. Narrative and Formal Notes

Despite being an offline video game, Hypnospace’s portrayal of an internet that has already been buried exudes a deep sense of liveliness. This is why it captivates from the very first moments and why it dialogues with a stagnant and automated present. On the contrary, this work emphasizes the human factor from the outset by pointing to the human-technology symbiosis as the fundamental pillar of a bright future [Fig. 1]. However, the irony of the approach lies in the fact that these premises are endorsed by Merchantsoft, a company that has developed a device called HypnOS that allows its users to connect to the Hypnospace internet network while they sleep (hello Neuralink). The underlying intention of Hypnospace is to integrate technology into people’s daily lives, making it infinitely accessible. The dreamlike hyperbole behind the idea of never disconnecting from technology was evident in commercials such as the one for Windows 95, aimed at a general audience who could use the computer for any task and on any occasion (even in a restaurant!); or in others such as Newcom, in which a teenager physically enters the Information Superhighway, synonymous with the internet, which seemed to reference Nam June Paik’s Electronic Superhighway.

Fig. 1 Screenshot from Hypnospace Outlaw. Frame from the video that welcomes the user and introduces them to Merchansoft technology.

Connecting and sharing with others under the laws of cyberspace were the symbol of a hopeful race toward the future, whose success depended on who had the power of these tools. This reasoning is followed by skeptical manifestos such as Mark Dery’s Culture Jamming, which, as early as 1993, saw the internet as a possible solution to an American society lobotomized by television. For Dery, through the virtual mirages of reality, users could take control of this technology to subvert stagnant cultural codes in an act that draws on détournement, photomontage, samizdat, and ultimately, hacking. The static nature and passivity of television would be replaced by the nomadism and interactivity of virtual communities that would gradually take up more space in our psyche, paving the way for true virtual reality. This narrative, also prophesied by the futurists of the time, is the roadmap for the equally naïve Hypnospace.

Within this sleepwalking internet, its users can create spaces in which to share their concerns with complete freedom, which means that, as in the 1990s, a unit (the player) is needed to moderate the content. This premise is the backbone of the entire work, which is nothing more than a MacGuffin to advance through a non-linear story about a company that led its invention to a fatal end. The enthusiasm radiated by websites such as GeoCities and humor blogs such as Something Awful inspired its developer, Jay Tholen, to create the game’s fictional websites[i], which follow a now-lost structure in which the host introduces themselves to the anonymous visitor and invites them to immerse in their interests in religion, skeletons, or cryptids [Fig. 2].

Fig. 2 Screenshot from Hypnospace Outlaw. Website discussing the cryptid Tall Green.

What is relevant about this artificial internet is how it mediates the feeling of nostalgia beyond postmodern intertextuality, as occurs, for example, in the life and work of Ann Hirsch, whose use of GIFs and vlogs shapes an art that deals with digital identity and hyperfemininity [ii]; while other artists such as Lizzie Klein capture the influence of virtual nostalgia in their work to create photographs that are essentially anachronistic [Fig. 3]. Therefore, the nostalgia that predominates in Hypnospace Outlaw is reflective in nature, aware of the inability and futility of returning to the past but, with a layer of contradictory irony, manages to bring it back [iii]. In this way, the work enters into the same hauntological game that has dominated certain internet phenomena and so seduced Simon Reynolds and Mark Fisher, such as Vaporwave, the music of Leyland Kirby, or the digital crackling of vinyl records [iv]. Here, the slow start-up of the game interface, visually inaccessible websites, cyberbullying, and the emulation of poor bandwidth are details that shake up the present in order to de-idealize an artificially remote past.

Fig. 3 Photograph of Lizzie Klein’s ongoing project Health Freak.

It should be noted that the interest this work aroused at the time is partly a consequence of the proliferation of countless aesthetics and vernacular subcultures, ranging from the fascination with liminal spaces studied by Valentina Tanni and Raquel Luaces to the countless -core subcultures that form the backbone of the current Internet Core. Hence, Hypnospace Outlaw serves as a good example of capturing the nature of the aesthetic to which it belongs, Y2K, since this aesthetic umbrella encompasses all the imagery produced around the dreaded Y2K bug, which ultimately did not cause any problems. Therefore, the contradictory facet of nostalgia emerges in this work to the delight of a player who sees how certain characters gradually go crazy on their blogs with the advent of the year 2000.

As a contextual colophon to this part, it is worth recounting the final spiral of a story that is both emotional and tragic:

In the last setback, fears became reality and, during the turn of the millennium, the HypnOS  bands that all users were using failed at the same time due to a bad system update. This caused thousands of injuries and six deaths. However, the blame was placed on a teenager who created a harmless but eye-catching virus with the intention of getting a girl’s attention, a fact that unjustly condemned him to six years in prison. Despite this, years later, our final task will be to delve into files that prove how the computer cataclysm could have been avoided if the creator of Hypnospace had not succumbed to delusions of grandeur, as his stubborn obsession with improving the system went against numerous medical reports urging him to discontinue the product. After the success of our task, its creator confessed everything and accepted his sentence, but not before revealing that his remorse had been expressed through several letters lamenting the deaths of young and innocent victims [Fig. 4]. In the background, a melody accompanies the final scene with lyrics that continuously repeat the phrase: “Y2K, you let me down”.

Fig. 4 Screenshot from Hypnospace Outlaw. Letter addressed to one of the collateral victims.

Towards Another Path. The Lessons of Hypnospace Outlaw

To create a fictional microcosm of Hypnospace’s caliber, it is necessary to engage in dialogue with the productions of its time through pastiche and self-referential aspects, in addition to the aforementioned intertextuality. This postmodern miscellany, common to our mass of contemporary cultural objects that capitalize on nostalgia, is evident in the zeitgeist that shapes the game to the point of creating something new. The utopia referred to here is the same one that underlies in every feeling of nostalgia, a utopia to strive for or a utopia that could have been but was not. However, what has prevailed in our era is that failed utopia, the one that was glimpsed after the end of history and which, according to Grafton Tanner, was consolidated after the 9/11 attacks [v].

The designers are fully aware of this fact, as behind the façade of references that shape Hypnospace Outlaw, there are other more subtle ones that play with the ironic ambivalence typical of a virtual culture accustomed to playing with masks. Several examples clearly illustrate this. Merchantsoft (Microsoft), the company that designed Hypnospace, is followed by SquisherZ (Pokémon), a game that consists of collecting fluffy creatures; Professor Helper (Clippy), a virtual assistant who is not usually very helpful [Fig. 5]; the free music distribution system FLST (Napster); and websites with interactive hypertext stories that marked the work of net artists such as Olia Lialina, Mark America, and Shu Lea Cheang.

Fig. 5 Screenshot of Hypnospace Outlaw. Professor Helper website.

However, the most interesting ones are those that not only reference but also redefine the notion in question. This is the case with the harmless virus that was nothing more than a covert declaration of love, reminiscent of the famous ILoveYou computer worm; or with Mindcrash, a euphemism for the Y2K problem that caused so many deaths; while other events, such as the one that merged numerous websites into one, thus forcibly displacing many users, seem to allude to the subsequent birth of Web 2.0, the cornerstone of the platforms that now dominate the internet and stoned the virtual flâneur without a destination of his own on a website without hierarchies.[vi]

Although the internet has proven to be a tool capable of distorting time and turning the past and present into a spongy mass, as Simon Reynolds points out [vii], the fact that anyone can access any object under the guise of nostalgia does not necessarily symbolize that we are facing a cultural recession. As with many advances, the significant change lies in the accessibility and speed they bring, not in the new opportunities they offer, as these were often already possible before.

Due to the pace at which phenomena occur on the internet, it is natural for new cultural trends to coexist with outdated ones that manage to pass the novelty filter, a fact that further accelerates contemporary presentism. This is where the aforementioned aesthetics would be situated, which, when referencing the past, always err on the side of translating the selective amnesia of a community that identifies with anachronistic and poeticized codes. That is why Hypnospace Outlaw shows not only how much has been lost (or expired) in recent decades in terms of the internet, but also, as glimpsed earlier, it collects what only a historically blind person would miss, such as finding gore content by chance or being greeted by a shrill MIDI melody on every website. However, what has gradually evolved is the new sense of community to which the work refers so much.

Today, some of the contradictory notions of Gary Cross’s consumed nostalgia are even more noticeable. From his thesis on nostalgia that has been absorbed and regurgitated by the market through objects and passing fads, it is worth mentioning his interest in how it has created micro-identities common to a large number of people who interact with each other from a position of individuality [viii]. This code of conduct is the basis for hegemonic forums such as Reddit or, conversely, 4chan. Therefore, despite the loss brought about by a new vertical and commercialized model of the internet, what is truly desired is a human factor that remains latent beyond the mere consumption of virtual content.

Over time, the internet became completely ingrained in people’s lives, occupying both their work and leisure time. It is the place where you pay your bills. Society, seeing its pace of life and work mediated by the internet, created refuges out of nostalgia, sharing experiences and interests through those same platforms that were built on the ruins of others in the past. We saw how a non-place like the internet, that is, an anonymous, transitory place with no agency, became for different generations of people a landscape of nostalgic escape where everyone could partially recognize themselves and align themselves to ensure a different future. And although this fact may be inexorably conditioned by market and political interests, nostalgically longing for a promised future can always awaken in those who identify with it a sudden interest that brings with it the possibility of change.

The Possible Internet

In essence, part of that promised future portrayed by Hypnospace Outlaw has actually been realized in our reality, only based on the same socioeconomic dynamics that sustain the network. Aesthetically, the informational and visual anarchy that prevailed on the internet at the turn of the century has been replaced by more accessible, intuitive, and concrete interfaces, which has brought with it an oversimplification that advocates for easier navigation of different websites at the expense of a flatter appearance. Hence the artistic interest in recovering that spirit of “anything goes” that was lost in pursuit of a corporate aesthetic that, for the moment, still predominates in all spaces. Those who, beyond its aesthetic value, revere bastions of that era such as the green head of the Windows Player [Fig. 6a/6b], are not only indulging in nostalgia, but are also seeking, through these lost remnants of craftsmanship, an agency within an internet that is inseparable from everyday life.

Fig. 6a “Green Head.” Skin for the Windows Millenium Edition operating system music player, 2000.

Fig. 6b “Green Head.” Skin for the Hypnospace Outlaw music player.

The denial of the future, which has been exacerbated by an essentially retrograde technology such as the algorithm, could be mitigated if the mercantilist factor that brings with it the rebirth of past eras were removed. In order to avoid superficial gestures that feed back into communities as commodities, which Byung-Chul Han refers to as the “end of all community”,[ix] we must turn in a direction that escapes the nihilism of eras such as the one described here, whose non-collapse after the year 2000 condemned it to having to “fulfill” its promises. This fact, however, is what certifies that another path is possible despite the development that the internet and its culture may have undergone.

Although currently taking a step forward and opposing the hegemonic internet through the use of decentralized networks or free software applications is equivalent to the attitude of a contemporary Thoreau, the truth is that their mere existence shows how the flame lit by collectives and artists such as Monochrom, Critical Art Ensemble, and Sadie Plant through manifestos is still alive and becoming more necessary than ever. Works such as Hypnospace Outlaw, which require careful attention and special dedication to immerse oneself in the reflection of a world that once was, possess a transformative spirit, hidden behind the veil of nostalgia that is not always properly glimpsed. If we dissociate the consumerist and viral aspects of these works and aesthetics with echoes of the past, we can turn to transgressive creations that use the abject, the queer, dreams, the kitsch, glitches, or ecology as banners to shake the foundations of present-day culture. Although immaterial, it is essential to take a stand against what dissipates our agency in what remains of cyberspace. After all, even though it has been reviled and misrepresented, the continuum that pursues nostalgia as an engine of change still feeds back into culture; what remains, therefore, is to cautiously position ourselves behind the lights of a feeling capable of imagining new presents.

Author bio

Francisco Villalobos is currently developing his thesis on internet culture at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Based on the theoretical framework of post-internet and digital folklore, his PhD research investigates how internet culture has created a vernacular language about digital daily life and the consequences of living conditioned by internet technology. He is also interested in the role played by video games on the internet and in other audiovisual manifestations that shape today’s cyberspace.

References

[i] Richardson, L., (2023). “The influences and surprising origins of Hypnospace Outlaw” RockPaperShotgun. https://www.rockpapershotgun.com/the-influences-and-surprising-origins-of-hypnospace-outlaw.

[ii] Chan, J., (2012). “The Real Ann Hirsch: The Power of Performative Fiction” Illuminati Girl Gang Vol. II, Oct 29. https://htmlgiant.com/web-hype/illuminati-girl-gang-vol-2/.

[iii] Boym, S., (2001). The Future of Nostalgia. New York: Basic Books: 18.

[iv] Fisher, M., (2014). Ghosts of my Life. Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures. Winchester: zero books: 74 – 76.

[v] Tanner, G., (2022). Las horas han perdido su reloj. Las políticas de la nostalgia. Barcelona: Alpha Decay: 47 – 49.

[vi] Darling, J., (2015). “Arcades, Mall Rats, and Tumblr Thugs” in Lauren Cornell, Ed Halter (eds) Mass Effect. Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century. Massachusetts: MIT Press: 325 – 328.

[vii] Reynolds, S., (2011). Retromania. Pop Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past. New York: Faber and Faber: 62.

[viii] Cross, G., (2015). Consumed Nostalgia. Memory in the Age of Fast Capitalism. New York: Columbia University Press: 14 – 18.

[ix] Han, B.-C., (2021). No-cosas. Quiebras del mundo de hoy. Barcelona: Taurus: 31.

Introducing FACEBOOK MUSEUM: Bringing the End Closer Together

A Project by the Dutch Media Art Collective SETUP

The networking site Facebook, founded in 2003, was once the beating heart of our online social world—the place where we felt connected, friendships were formed, and self-discovery developed. These days, the platform has become a symbol of everything that can go wrong with social media: polarization, hate, disinformation, data extraction, and AI slop. When Facebook is mentioned, a widespread sense of unease is evoked. We should have cancelled our accounts a long time ago, yet many of us still cling on; there are still more than 3 billion active monthly users worldwide. Instead of calling on guilt and pushing alternatives, SETUP asked itself the simple question: why can’t we let it go?

In public debates about social media, our emotional attachment to these platforms is rarely discussed. Facebook isn’t just an app. It’s a digital diary of our lives, full of memories, relationships, and events. To start that conversation, we built the Facebook Museum: a place where we collectively can say goodbye to Facebook, where we both celebrate and question this platform’s beautiful and ugly sides. Before we can let go of Facebook, we first need to understand how and why we’re attached and what role Facebook played in our lives.

In July 2025, the Dutch Media Art Collective SETUP opened the world’s first temporary Facebook Museum in the main hall of Utrecht Central Station, the Netherlands’ busiest railway station. A pop-up museum where visitors could donate their own Facebook data, relive memories, and discuss their digital identity. The project attracted over 5,000 visitors and received widespread national media attention. The response illustrated the heartfelt need to reflect not only critically, but also emotionally and collectively on our digital past – and with it our digital future.

In December 2025, SETUP received financial support from the Dutch SIDN Fund to scale up and diversify the Facebook Museum in 2026.

Please visit www.facebook.museum (at the moment only in Dutch) to get an impression of the experience, the press coverage and visual material. This introductory posting gives an overview of the different elements of the museum and what SETUP imagines are possible directions the project can take.

What’s there to experience? Visitors can participate in the curation of what should be remembered about our joint time on Facebook, score keepsakes in the museum shop and vote on a suitable location for the permanent Facebook Museum. In addition, they can donate their Facebook data, reflect on their favorite Facebook moments and leave a card for this on a remembrance wall.

Existing Museum Sections:  

Pedestals with Objects and Stories

Multiple pedestals feature objects symbolising the experiences of six people who have had a startling, or sometimes exemplary, experience with Facebook. The objects appeal to the imagination, such as a cat collar, a pile of pubic hair, or a squash racket. Each pedestal reads the opening of the said story, accompanied by a QR code that the audience can scan with their phone to explore the story further. The stories alternate between positive and negative experiences about, on, and around Facebook. From testimonials of cosy crochet Facebook group members, to traumatised content moderators or victims of online doxing. The individual stories can be read here (in Dutch).

Preservation Wall

The preservation wall is a large blue wall holding three screens on which typical Facebook content passes by: cat pictures, illustrious Facebook groups, and memes. Visitors can vote on what content to preserve as Facebook’s cultural heritage by pressing the corresponding buttons below the screens.

Remembrance Wall

Like the preservation wall, the remembrance wall is a place of memories and nostalgia. Visitors can leave their personal (both beautiful and unpleasant) experiences with Facebook on the wall. Other visitors can browse through these testimonials and reflect on everything we have experienced together on this platform.

Data Donation Box

As the text on the Museum facade indicates (“Don’t delete your Facebook profile yet!”), we do not advise people to remove their Facebook profile indiscriminately. In addition to a trip down memory lane and insight into how culture-defining Facebook is (and has been), visitors also have the opportunity to donate their own Facebook data. They can put their downloaded Facebook data on a USB stick and submit it to the museum, to ensure that this valuable digital cultural heritage is not lost. We have made a clear step-by-step plan for the visitor on how to export your data from Facebook, archive it, and donate it to the museum if desired:  https://www.setup.nl/app/uploads/2025/12/a5large-fbdata-wikkelvouw-1mmbleed-fogra39.pdf

Scale Model of the Proposed Permanent Museum

Halfway through the exhibition space, you will come across a scale model of the permanent museum in the shape of a huge F. Next to the model, there’s a map of the Netherlands. Here, visitors can vote where the future permanent museum should be located, by pasting a blue sticker on their desired city, village or place.

Merchandise

An exit through the gift shop. At the moment available are: In Memoriam candles, t-shirts, postcards, wooden USB ‘coffins’, tote bags, booklets (a DIY guide to Facebook scrapbooking), and (tracking) cookies.

Future Exhibition Options:

1. The Complete Museum Setup (unmanned)

A setup which we can show for a month or more, and tell our full story. In essence, it’s the collection of all museum components as we used them during the pilot at Utrecht Central Station, yet adapted to the context where visitors can look around independently. No crew or museum hosts from SETUP are required for this. The Utrecht Central setup was focused on luring passers-by, selling merchandise and talking to visitors.

2. Small Museum Setup (unmanned)

A setup that we can place at a desired location for at least a week or a month. It is a more compact and focused version of the exhibition at Utrecht Central Station.

3. The Festival Experience (manned)

A setup for a few days or a long weekend, in which visitors quickly get a compact but strong impression. During Betweter Festival 2025 (a science festival in Utrecht with 2,500 visitors), we have already carried out a successful pilot. Here, visitors can share memories and craft mourning cards for their favourite Facebook moments using content from their own Facebook profile. For this, we provide photo printers, scrapbook materials, and other decoration materials. This activity results in spontaneous conversations about digital memories. If desired, we can adjust this experience to the context of your event.

Talks, Keynotes and Panels that SETUP Offers

Polarisation, screen addiction, brain rot. Our conscience speaks increasingly stronger to leave Facebook. However, this is easier said than done. How do we find emotional closure from this platform? And how do we preserve all the digital cultural heritage we have collectively created on it?

A talk of your preferred duration about our research findings on our attachment to big tech’s social media platforms in launching the Facebook Museum, and why it is so difficult to break free from these. We also provide insight into the design process of the Facebook Museum. Depending on the request, we can focus the talk on one or multiple of the themes and topics below. Additionally, it is possible for one or more of our colleagues to take part in a panel on the themes and topics below. If desired, we can also assemble and/or moderate a panel.

Themes that can be discussed:

  • Influence and dependence on big tech platforms (both individual and societal)
  • Collective attachment to big tech platforms
  • Detachment of big tech’s social media (both rational and emotional), and what alternative strategies and language to develop for it
  • Moving away from big tech’s social media on a business / professional level
  • Design fiction, future fiction, speculative design methods:how to explore alternative future scenarios by means of artistic research
  • Digital cultural heritage and how to curate, archive, and make it sustainably available

If you are interested in one or more of our Facebook Museum components, we can send a quote tailored to preferences and adjustments. For this, please contact Jiska Koenders – jiska@setup.nl

This first overview of the Facebook Museum project was written by SETUP’s staff member Marissa Memelink, together with Geert Lovink@INC.

About SETUP

The Utrecht-based Dutch cultural organization SETUP, founded in 2010, researches the impact of technology on society. Our focus isn’t investigating technology as a technical object (“how does it work?”) or as an expressive medium (“how can I make art with it?”) but as a force field within our community. SETUP creates accessible designs to make these power dynamics and their abstract effects tangible for a large audience. In doing so, we focus on the everyday future of technology. Because stories about new technology still often revolve around science fiction themes: a distant future where either everything is possible – or everything goes wrong. AI, for example, in 100 years will either “solve all our problems” or “take all our jobs.” But these scenarios omit important questions. Who pays the price for this new technology? What power does it create, and where is this situated? What interests are at play, and what ideologies constitute the design of these systems? That’s why we explore near-future scenarios in our artistic research, for which we look ahead a maximum of 5 to 10 years.

SETUP’s mission is to create a technology-critical society. A society in which everyone can participate in discussions and reflections on the development and deployment of new technology. Eventually, this will lead to other hardware, platforms, and power structures. But it all starts with a critical community surrounding these systems, actively exploring what a healthy relationship with technology means for them. Our philosophy is that in order to move towards an alternative future with technology, one first has to be able to imagine it. We believe the arts provide the free space necessary to question and investigate these alternative scenarios. Artists play a crucial role in this: creating images and agendas, offering a broader perspective, and posing critical questions. Not just as a mirror, but also as a crowbar. www.setup.nl

Previous Projects by SETUP

Since its foundation in 2010, SETUP’s projects have been focused on the Dutch-speaking community and have always had a critical yet cheeky-hilarious approach. Some examples of previous projects:

The pottery-robot Man and machine are often portrayed in the media as competitors. But can we explore a complementary relationship? Forget all the robots that ‘catch up’, ‘beat’ or ‘replace’ us. Come and merge into a beautiful symbiosis with our pottery robot. – https://www.setup.nl/projecten/de-pottenbakrobot/

Nude prompting workshop Does the advent of AI image generators make nude model drawing more accessible than ever? We put it to the test and bumped into more interesting hiccups than initially expected… https://www.setup.nl/projecten/naaktprompten-naaktmodel-tekenen-met-ai/

Project dodo – an exoskeleton for the dodo Through advanced biogenetic engineering, scientists are currently de-extincting the long-lost dodo bird. But once returned to earth, how do we make the dodo 21st-century proof? A project exploring human techno-solutionist tendencies. https://www.setup.nl/projecten/an-exoskeleton-for-the-dodo/

Alternative stock photography for technology Shiny humanoid robots, green Matrix code or brains full of zeros and ones. Photos accompanying tech news leave a lot to be desired. They maintain a mystified impression of what the technology is and what it means for us. Could it be done differently? https://www.setup.nl/projecten/nieuwe-stockfotos-voor-technologie/

Audio-visual material about the Facebook Museum:

Photos (credits: Bas de Meijer): https://www.flickr.com/photos/setuputrecht/albums/72177720327588487/with/54659546529
Video: https://www.setup.nl/video/het-facebook-museum/

Articles by SETUP about the Facebook Museum (in Dutch):

We richten een Facebook Museum op
Stichting Facebook Museum is officieel – dit is ons bestuur
Na het Facebook Museum willen we sociale media niet meer verslavend noemen
Sociale media zijn massaal toxisch verklaard, tijd voor een waardig afscheid

Press publications (in Dutch):

Item op Radi0 1
https://www.nporadio1.nl/nieuws/wetenschap-techniek/ac2ab72e-c957-44e4-82a7-e92e2d0a9c02/afscheid-nemen-van-facebook-makkelijker-gezegd-dan-gedaan
Item op BNR nieuwsradio
https://www.bnr.nl/nieuws/tech-innovatie/10577510/eerste-facebookmuseum-ter-wereld-in-utrecht-digitaal-cultureel-erfgoed
Artikel op NOS online
https://nos.nl/regio/utrecht/artikel/654177-waarom-we-facebook-niet-gebruiken-maar-ook-niet-kunnen-loslaten
Artikel in Telegraaf
https://www.telegraaf.nl/video/uniek-facebook-museum-opent-doneer-jouw-data/77742247.html
Artikel in Trouw
https://www.trouw.nl/binnenland/in-utrecht-kun-je-al-rouwen-om-facebook-het-platform-werd-steeds-vijandiger~b8625de7/
Item in uitzending en online Hart van Nederland
https://www.hartvannederland.nl/het-beste-van-hart/panel/artikelen/facebook-sociale-media-social-hyves-panel-gebruikers-missen
Artikel in AD
https://www.ad.nl/utrecht/facebook-museum-op-utrecht-cs-we-hebben-er-jarenlang-lief-en-leed-gedeeld-die-data-is-waardevol~a439aaf5/
Item in Oranjezomer
https://www.kijk.nl/programmas/de-oranjezomer/SyLYboBPFSs

 

A Review of a Sexual History of the Internet & the Influencer Theorist

 Part One:

The Cyberfeminism Index 

In the past three years, we saw the Cyberfeminism Index on every hot, internet-pilled girl’s bedside table. Mindy Seu’s newest publication, A Sexual History of the Internet, is sure to follow in its lead.

The first time I saw the green book was in its birthplace, or at least across the river from Cambridge, in a Boston bookstore. It’s a thoroughly academic, transient city. The winters are long and cold, and the summers are hot and virtually desolate. 

While studying at the Harvard Graduate School of Design (GSD), Seu created a viral spreadsheet where contributors were invited to submit to an anti-canon, cyberfeminist, internet history. She would later win the 2019 Design Studies Thesis Prize for Cyberfeminist Catalog 1990-2019. The project became the webpage cyberfeminism.com. In 2023, the Cyberfeminism Index was traditionally published by Inventory Press. It functions as an encyclopedia and archive. Seu reframes the author not only as a producer, but as a curator.

Attending a nontraditional graduate program is in line with Seu’s overarching narrative. The GSD’s Master of Design supports alternative practices by facilitating concentrations in publics, narratives, ecologies, and mediums. This is her first divergence from the canon of the graphic designer, which is stereotypically marked by a BFA from an art school and an advertising adjacent practice.

A Sexual History of the Internet Lecture Performance

A Sexual History of the Internet is a lecture performance and an artist book that is the size of a phone. A phone is the vessel, or as artist Melanie Hoff calls it, a “sex toy”[1], that each attendee will experience the performance through. 

I went to the Hamburg performance on November 6th, 2025. If Seu’s Cyberfeminism Index tour had an air of production, this is the lecture performance in its final form. It begins academically, with stilettos echoing on hard floor. This brought me back to 6th grade when I had a pumpkin-haired teacher who enjoyed shopping for high heels during class. The event’s crowd was well dressed, mostly in black, and English was the overwhelmingly spoken language. 

I arrived on time and was late as a result. I had forgotten about German punctuality. I settled on the back stairs overlooking the main floor. It felt like watching the trailers play before the movie came on. When the lights went red, and Seu entered the room, it only took a second for the chatter to still. She is undoubtedly a gravitational personality. 

In a phone-based lecture, your device is no longer your own. It becomes a projector, a green screen, and a whiteboard for the lecturer to disseminate their research. Ideally, you would never even touch your screen. Due to the internet connection, the lecture vehicle (Instagram Stories) experienced continuous lag. This resulted in a disjointed collective voice during the audience participation portion. The moments in which Seu recited the script herself, unwavering and professor-like, were the best of the night.

The book was born out of necessity. Early Instagram accounts featuring the lecture were taken down due to violations of Meta’s content guidelines. Adult nudity is prohibited, real or computer-generated. Nudity is allowed in the case of art or medical imagery, which is likely the reason that the account is live today.

In Seu’s 2023 MFA course at Yale School of Art, graduate student Julio Correra was experimenting with “Instagram Stories as a vehicle for publishing”[2]. She credits Correra as the originator of this concept, which speaks to her ethos to “aggregate, together with collaborators, disparate pieces from an ecosystem, and develop the appropriate container”[3]. Attributing this early concept to Correra is valuable and mutually beneficial. He is cited as 1 of 30 creators of the book on Metalabel.

The Gatherer

This publication makes use of a new model of profit distribution. In traditional publishing, the author will earn around 10% of the royalties, and the publisher 90%. In this case, the profits are divided: 10% Metalabel, 60% team, and 30% contributors. If the print run of 4000 sells out, each contributor will earn $850 USD.

Yancey Strickler founded Metalabel, a “collaborative publishing and releasing tool” where “A group of authors collectively releasing a work becomes practically very possible”[4]. On the platform, he created the group, The Dark Forest Collective, which A Sexual History of the Internet is a part of. Its members include Yancey Strickler, Joshua Citerella, Mindy Seu, and more. There are also contributors who have played a role in a project. 

Through the act of gathering information, Seu brings it into her metaphorical pile. Her role is in taking abstract knowledge and resources and centralizing them. A pitfall of this model is that the discourse can surround the person at the forefront of the conversation rather than the individual contributors.

Part Two:

The Graphic Designer to Literally-Anything-Else Pipeline

The graphic designer to literally-anything-else pipeline is a phenomenon where one studied design as an undergraduate, but has a career in anything and everything else. It’s a type of figure or character [5]. Seu is an example of this. She has a BA in Design Media Arts from UCLA, but outsources the design of her books to her collaborator, Laura Coombs.

Silvio Lorusso, designer, professor, and author of What Design Can’t Do and Entreprecariat, “writes and talks about design, though [does] very little of it, and [believes] in it less and less” [6]. My own undergraduate professors were not disillusioned by what design is in the world. One of them, a Yale MFA graduate, remarked that “the purpose of design is just to make the world a more beautiful place”.

In creative circles, everyone has a friend who studied graphic design but pivoted to social media, film, big tech, fashion production, or accounting. As a design graduate myself, I have lived experience working alongside designers and their evolved form: the artist influencer. Famous examples are Maya Man, Harriet Richardson, and Molly Soda. They have roots in graphic design, but have become artists, period, with projects like A Realistic Day in My Life Living in New York City and (The Angels Wanna Wear My) Red Shoes.

At the Institute of Network Cultures, In conversation about the Internet Theorist, a colleague proposed that “Joshua Citarella has to be buff, and Alex Quicho has to post her selfies”. They perform what they practice. In that sense, Mindy Seu has to model for Jaquemus, host events for Pornhub & Pillow Talk, and lecture at UCLA the next morning. It’s part of her character design; her projected image has become her lived performance. Seu has become synonymous with her LA apartment. Her bachelor pad is so #2016 core LA pink wall coded. It’s aspirational. I would have reblogged it on Tumblr. Being an artist is a performance, as is being a lecturer.

Mindy Seu’s Los Angeles apartment. IG @mindyseu.

In November of 2025, a TikTok user filmed a series of videos praising the meandering and nonlinear career, amassing over one million views. Joining the conversation, another user made a video with Mindy Seu’s CV as the background, dubbing her the patron saint of career breadth. The discussion contained praise and curiosity, “Commenting to stay on multi-passionate tok”, and “Who is Mindy Seu and why do we have her spreadsheet anyway?”. The instability of the current job market is reflected in the popularization of job related discourse and memes: jobs girls want, handing you a job application, and jobs people, jobs.

The existence of the Influencer Theorist is a result of the shift to project-based work in the gig economy. The Americanism of worshipping fame, money, and success above all else reinforces this. In the States, it’s a cultural belief that notoriety and success are one in the same. The viral theorist has both #normcore social currency (job) and digital social currency (loyal followers).

A Day in the Life of a Graphic Designer Turned Wannabe Influencer Theorist

To propose this particular wannabe Influencer Theorist, I first had to attend four years of art school. My favorite professor at Boston University wore Ganni and Tabis. A former BFA student got hired at Baggu, so my classmates and I worshipped Baggu. Halfway through my degree, I started admiring graphic designers who publish. I happened to join the design department around the same time as Kathleen and Christopher Sleboda of Draw Down Books. In 2022, they began hosting the Multiple Formats Art Book Fair, where I attended panels featuring Printed Matter, Queer.Archive.Work, Genderfail, and Catalog Press. The most memorable lecture was Brendan Page’s on The Villa, a publication made from feeding thousands of Love Island stills into 3D scanning software. My interest in alternative design practices rooted in theory and research led me to the publication, The Lazy Art of Screenshot, and eventually to work at the Institute of Network Cultures. 


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POV: You wake up in Sandy Liang bow socks with a slit cut for Margiela Tabis. God, they were expensive, but they sure are chic. Time for your morning routine: flipping through Instagram Stories. You’re captivated by an Influencer Theorist modeling for Helmut Lang at 9, and guest lecturing by 11. How do they do it?! Time to post on main: Subletting Bushwick apartment December 21st-26th, $200 per day. Includes a laser printer, many design books, and Gustaf Westman tableware. Friends, or friends of friends only!!! 

Your bio says bi-coastal, so to keep up appearances, you book a Spirit flight to LAX. Can’t be too expensive, we have #Eurosummer to think about. You’re planning on crashing the Venice Film Fest and staying at your study abroad host mom’s. It’s a long bus ride to the island, but you’ll be out partying all night with Timothee Chalamet look-alikes anyway. 

Today calls for a full GANNI sweat set. You’re tired from country line dancing at Buck Wild with New York’s laptop class. Before Stud Country closed, you used to see Kaia Gerber there. You’re winded from the six flights of stairs down to the lobby. There’s no elevator, duh, this building is pre-war. You stop into a Blank Street Coffee. You need to grind on crossposting for your Are.na and Substack presences. Wait, the guy ordering a cortado looks so familiar. Isn’t he the hot line cook from Addison Rae’s music video?! He’s, like, really TikTok famous. You should ask him to come on your podcast. You haven’t filmed an episode yet, but at least you have a name… something with ‘Famemaxxing’. It’s pretty theoretical. 

You order a sugar-free double iced vanilla latte with oat milk. This week, your calendar is full. You have to choose between a Chamberlain Coffee nighttime matcha rave at The Box or a Feeld x 818 Tequila arthouse film event in Dime Square. #Indecisive. You dig around your Baggu Colinda Strada Bag for a pen. Oh! So that’s where your cotton candy vape went. (You’ve been trying to get into cigarettes).

*ding*

An email from a publication you admire sends you right up out of your seat. Could it be!? Finally, a clouted opportunity at the correct intersection of arts and academia, not mainstream but not underground. You forget all about Famemaxxing, Gio the line cook, and your forthcoming Substack essay. Time to drop everything, hyperfocus on this opportunity, and rule out all possibilities of not being chosen. It’s called manifestation. You’ve got this, and you didn’t even need to niche-down.

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The wannabe Influencer Theorist looks up to Mindy Seu. They can only become enlightened when person and persona are indistinguishable, when their projected image becomes their lived performance. Authenticity becomes a finite, mineable resource in the performance of existing online. Is the influencification of these roles: theorist, designer, dentist, harmful? No, not necessarily. Is it spiritually American? Yes. The practice is rooted in the culture of fame-worshipping. Sure, Utah’s early Mormon mommy bloggers weren’t initially in it for the money, but look at the Secret Lives of Mormon Wives now. In American-derivative work, everything increases in size, fame, and cost.

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Eva Brown is a Graphic Design graduate of Boston University’s College of Fine Arts and Intern at the Institute of Network Cultures. She is interested in expanded publishing, digital futures, internet aesthetics, and The Book as an object.

 

[1] Mindy Seu, A Sexual History of the Internet, 00:45. https://asexualhistoryoftheinternet.com/.

[2] Mindy Seu, A Sexual History of the Internet, 19. https://asexualhistoryoftheinternet.com/.

[3] Mindy Seu, “On Gathering”, Shift Space, 2023. https://issue1.shiftspace.pub/on-gathering-mindy-seu.

[4] The Institute of Network Cultures, .expub, Exploring Expanded Publishing, 180. https://expandedpublishing.net/.

[5] Geert Lovink, Platform Brutality, Chapter: The Principles of Figure Design. https://valiz.nl/en/publications/platform-brutality.

[6] Silvio Lorusso, What Design Can’t Do, biography. https://www.setmargins.press/books/what-design-cant-do/.